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Abstract
Prediction markets which trade on contracts representing unknown future outcomes
are designed specifically to aggregate expert predictions via the market price. While
there are some existing machine learning interpretations for the market price and
connections to Bayesian updating under the equilibrium analysis of such markets,
there is less of an understanding of what the instantaneous price in sequentially
traded markets means. In this thesis I show that the prices generated in sequen-
tially traded prediction markets are stochastic approximations to the price given by
an equilibrium analysis. This is done by showing that the equilibrium price is a
solution to a stochastic optimisation problem which is solved by stochastic mirror
descent (SMD) by a class of sequential pricing mechanisms. This connection leads to
proposing a scheme called “mini-trading” which introduces a parameter related to
the learning rate in SMD. I prove several properties of this scheme and show that it
can improve the stability of prices in sequentially traded prediction markets.
Also I analyse two popular trading models (namely the Maximum Expected Util-
ity model and the Risk-measure model) in respect to an assumption on the class of
traders I required to interpret sequential markets as SMD. I derive a sufficient con-
dition for when the Maximum Expected Utility traders satisfy this assumption, but
show that risk-measure based traders naturally satisfy this assumption for the type
of markets I consider. Then I show that the “regret” of mini-trading markets (with
respect to equilibrium markets) depend on the mini-trade parameter.
Finally I attempt to compare the wealth updates of traders in sequential markets
to the wealth updates in equilibrium markets, since this would help to extend the
interpretation of equilibrium markets as performing Bayesian updates to sequential
markets. For this I present preliminary results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis Statement
Both equilibrium markets and sequential cost function based markets can be inter-
preted as solutions to the same learning problem in terms of the market price, thereby
naturally extending the existing interpretations of equilibrium markets as perform-
ing known aggregations to sequential markets. I also give preliminary results that
relate the wealth updates of traders in equilibrium markets to sequential markets,
which would extend the existing interpretations of equilibrium markets as perform-
ing Bayesian updating to sequential markets.
1.2 Introduction
The main purposes of prediction markets are eliciting and aggregating beliefs over
an unknown future outcome. Traders with different beliefs trade on contracts whose
payoff’s are related to an unknown future outcome and the market prices of the con-
tracts are considered as the aggregated beliefs. While machine learning aggregation
models (such as boosting) perform aggregations over expert beliefs or machine learn-
ing models, prediction markets can be used to appeal to the wisdom of the crowds
[Surowiecki, 2004] and may also be used to aggregate expert/model beliefs with hu-
man judgement. But unlike in machine learning algorithms where expert beliefs are
readily available for aggregation, traders in a prediction market may have to be in-
centivised to participate in the market.
One feature of most of the machine learning aggregation methods including boost-
ing and hedging is the combination of multiple homogeneous models (i.e., models
of the same type) for aggregation (in boosting and hedging, the set of predictors
are obtained by using the same weak-learning algorithm iteratively). But prediction
markets have the capability to work with traders who have diverse information and
1
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diverse decision making models, so prediction markets can also be used to imple-
ment generalised aggregations.
Recently many connections between prediction markets and machine learning have
been shown based on the (Walrasian) equilibrium analysis. Storkey [2011] and
Storkey et al. [2012] show how well-known aggregation techniques including ma-
jority voting (mode), simple averaging (mean) (in random forests [Breiman, 2001]),
weighted-mean (in AdaBoost [Freund and Schapire, 1995]), median, weighted-median,
mixtures of experts [Jacobs et al., 1991] can be re-created in prediction markets.
Beygelzimer et al. [2012] show connections to Bayesian updating for markets with
Kelly bettors [Kelly, 1956], which Storkey et al. [2012] generalise for a more wider
class of traders. Lay and Barbu [2011] show how different trading behaviour can
lead to implementing weighted averaging, kernel methods, logistic regression in
prediction markets. Although these connections present nice interpretations of pre-
diction markets in a machine learning point of view, more often the equilibrium
analysis does not provide a closed-form solution and pre-suppose some kind of off-
equilibrium trading process that eventually converges to a point whose properties
are studied.
Sequential markets, where traders act in sequence, have been widely adopted in
practice. For the purpose of this thesis I adopt a type of market with an Automated
Market-Maker where traders are only allowed to trade with a central market maker in
a sequential fashion (typically at the price that is determined by the market-maker).
Chen and Pennock [2007] show that Sequential Cost Function based Markets (which
is the type of sequential market I consider in this thesis) have connections to the
popular Market Scoring Rules by Hanson [2007] which uses a Proper Scoring Rule
to reward participants based on their reports. Chen and Vaughan [2010] show con-
nections to follow-the-reguralized-leader/ no-regret algorithms using cost function
based markets. Further connections with weight updates of experts in follow-the-
reguralized-leader algorithms and price updates of contracts in sequential cost func-
tion based markets have been shown by Abernethy et al. [2011]. Even though there
are well specified price update mechanisms for sequential markets, the market dy-
namics become difficult to analyse due to the sequential nature of trading.
The primary focus of this thesis is to relate sequential markets with equilibrium
markets. The aim is to be able to use sequential markets to approximate equilibrium
market connections with machine learning. The main contribution of this thesis re-
lates sequential and equilibrium markets in terms of the market prices. This is done
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by interpreting the price updates of sequentially traded markets as Stochastic Mirror
Descent (SMD) and then interpreting its equilibrium as solving the same optimi-
sation problem, thus establishing a connection between sequential and equilibrium
market prices. The closest work to this result is by Frongillo et al. [2012] who first
interpreted sequential markets as performing a SMD and established a connection
between sequential markets and equilibrium analysis using limiting conditions on
sequential markets. The interpretation of sequential markets as SMD in this thesis
is a variation of their result for a more broader class of trades and a more restrictive
class of markets. Further this thesis establishes a connection between sequential mar-
kets and equilibrium without using limiting conditions.
I then introduce mini-trading as a mechanism for implementing the learning rate
parameter that is used for convergence in SMD. Also I analyse two popular trading
models (namely the Maximum Expected Utility model and the Risk-measure model)
in respect to the assumption on the class of traders I required to interpret sequential
markets as SMD.
Finally I attempt to compare sequential and equilibrium markets in terms of traders’
wealth updates, since equilibrium markets have been shown to implement Bayesian
wealth updates for traders. For this I obtain preliminary results.
1.3 Original Contributions
While the classical market analysis techniques (i.e., the Walrasian equilibrium) has
been shown to implement known machine learning aggregations and performing
generalised Bayesian updating, there is less of an understanding of what the instan-
taneous price in sequentially traded markets means and how the traders’ wealth
updates compare with the equilibrium setting.
The main contributions of this thesis are,
• Interpreting the instantaneous price of sequential markets as stochastically min-
imizing (via stochastic mirror descent(SMD)) the same objective as its Wal-
rasian equilibrium, thus unifying the meaning of instantaneous and equilib-
rium prices via an optimisation point of view (for markets and traders satisfy-
ing certain conditions).
• Designing “mini-trading” as a mechanism for implementing the learning rate
parameter that is used for convergence in SMD. The idea behind mini-trading
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is to allow repeated but small-scale trader interactions as opposed to single
but large-scale interactions in a sequential market, also resulting in more stable
prices and bounded worst-case loss.
• Showing that the Maximum Expected Utility trader model does not always
satisfy the conditions needed for the SMD interpretation. But the analysis pro-
vides a sufficient condition in which this is satisfied.
• Showing that the risk-measure based trader model satisfies the conditions needed
for the SMD interpretation.
• Showing that the “regret” of mini-trading markets (with respect to equilibrium
markets) depend on the mini-trade parameter.
• Showing that the total of traders’ wealth updates in mini-trading sequential
markets are not far off from the total equilibrium wealth updates, which are
preliminary results to relate sequential wealth updates with equilibrium wealth
updates.
1.4 Thesis Outline
First I introduce prediction markets and briefly discuss how prediction markets and
traders resemble machine learning aggregations and experts/models that are used
in machine learning aggregations in Section 2.1. Here I also discuss contracts in
prediction markets and how traders make demands (purchases) based on contract
pricing depending on their trader model (e.g., maximum expected utility model,
risk-measure based model). In Section 2.2, I describe the (Walrasian) equilibrium
model and its connections to machine learning aggregations. Then in Section 2.3, I
discuss sequential markets and focus on the type of sequential market that is con-
sidered in this thesis (namely cost-function based sequential markets) and discuss its
connections to machine learning methods. Then I discuss the importance of making
connections between equilibrium and sequential markets which have their own sep-
arate connections with machine learning and discuss the existing work in this area
(Section 2.4), and also discuss how the main contribution of this thesis (i.e., relating
sequential and equilibrium prices in Chapter 3) compares and differs from existing
work. I also briefly describe the interpretation of equilibrium wealth updates as
Bayesian wealth updates in Section 2.5, which motivates Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 gives the main contribution of the thesis by gaining a common understand-
ing of the market price in equilibrium and sequential markets. Before presenting the
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contribution I briefly introduce the two types of markets we consider (Section 3.1)
and present concepts related to convex analysis (Section 3.2) which makes it possible
to interpret the stochastic price update of sequential markets via stochastic mirror
descent. Section 3.3 starts by giving the assumptions on the markets and trader
demands and Theorem 1 interprets the instantaneous price of sequential markets
as stochastically minimizing (via stochastic mirror descent (SMD)) the same objec-
tive as its Walrasian equilibrium, thus unifying the meaning of instantaneous and
equilibrium prices via an optimisation point of view. The mini-trading mechanism
introduced in Section 3.4 can be seen as a mechanism for implementing the learning
rate parameter that is used for convergence in SMD. Then we show that mini-trading
has desirable properties like more stable prices (Theorem 2) and bounded worst-case
loss.
In Chapter 4, I analyse two popular trader models with respect to the assump-
tion we made on trader demands (i.e., the potential-based assumption defined in
Section 3.3.2) that makes it possible to interpret sequential pricing as SMD. The
Maximum Expected Utility trader model is considered in Section 4.1, which gives
a sufficient condition for potential-based demands (see Collorary 1 following The-
orem 3). The Risk-measure based model is considered in Section 4.2, resulting in
potential-based demands in particular trading scenarios (see Theorem 4). Section 4.3
obtains regret bounds for mini-trading sequential markets with potential based de-
mands with respect to equilibrium markets.
Chapter 5 presents preliminary work (Theorems 5 and 6) which compares the wealth
updates of traders with potential based demands in mini-trading sequential markets
with the wealth updates in equilibrium markets.
Finally, I present conclusions and future work in Chapter 6.
1.5 Publications and Collaborations
Most of Chapter 3 appeared in [Premachandra and Reid, 2013]. Preliminary ideas
in relating the maximum expected utility model to potential-demands were given in
[Premachandra, 2013]. Extensions to this work, including the possibility of interpret-
ing maximum expected utility model as potential-based demands (which resulted in
Section 4.1) and connecting sequential markets’ wealth updates to Bayesian wealth
updates (which resulted in Chapter 5), were discussed in [Premachandra and Reid,
2014].
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Here I will motivate the study of markets from a machine learning perspective and
introduce the notions of traders, contracts, prediction markets, equilibria, and se-
quential market making. After contrasting ensemble methods and market mecha-
nisms, I will discuss the existing work on understanding the behaviour of equilib-
rium and sequential prediction markets and their ability to aggregate agent beliefs, I
will argue that the relationship between these two kinds of markets is not well under-
stood, which is the focus area of this thesis. Central to the relationship given as the
main contribution of this thesis (presented in Chapter 3) is understanding models of
trader demand as it is the common link between the two types of markets. I briefly
review two existing models (Maximum Expected Utility and risk-based traders) that
are explored further in Chapter 4. Finally, I survey what is known about the dynam-
ics of repeated equilibrium markets (and relationships with ML) and point to some
of my results and open questions in Chapter 5 about repeated sequential markets.
2.1 Prediction markets
After a broad introduction to prediction markets, I discuss the similarities and dif-
ferences of prediction markets and ML ensemble methods in Section 2.1.2. I also
discuss contracts and their pricing in Section 2.1.3, and finally how trader behaviour
is influenced by trader models, beliefs and reaction to prices, etc. in Section 2.1.4.
2.1.1 Introduction to prediction markets
A market is a structure that allows buyers and sellers to exchange goods, services
or information. They vary in size (physical retail markets, shopping complex, com-
modity markets), location (village, town, local, national, international, web-based),
trading mechanism (barter, fixed price, bidding, auctions) and by what is traded.
Markets also provide direct and indirect information about the price, demand, avail-
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ability, stakeholders and can be used to identify patterns, trends and formulate be-
liefs. Financial markets (e.g., stock markets, bond markets, futures markets, currency
markets, money markets) which facilitate the exchange of liquid assets are widely
used for speculation on company stability, financial risk, price changes, exchange
rates, etc. This ability of markets emerge from the participants and stakeholders who
influence the market prices, demand and availability through various means such as
holding exclusive information, wealth, capacity of production (or number of shares,
betting instances available), regulations and even by illegal and unethical means.
The price of a certain asset in a stock market at a given time, which is the result
of the set of market interactions that occurred and each participant’s private valua-
tion of the asset, is normally a good indication of the expected benefit from holding
that asset. Likewise, there is evidence to suggest that the consensus belief of a group
of individuals with heterogeneous beliefs can give better results than a group of in-
dividuals with heterogeneous beliefs, the consensus belief of all might give better
results than taking the advice of a single individual [Surowiecki, 2004]. Then comes
the questions of how to aggregate the information and whether the individuals are
genuinely interested in helping to form a better opinion. This is also a problem in
crowdsourcing [Howe, 2006], which is a distributed problem-solving and production
model. Other approaches which address information aggregation are the ensemble
methods in machine learning and game-theoretic methods.
Financial markets are usually created to allow traders to hedge risks and with the ex-
istence of speculators who seek to make a profit from the current prices. Speculative
market prices often become a good estimate of future prices, being able to aggregate
a great deal of information in the market price [Hanson, 2003]. While this feature of
price discovery through information aggregation is a side effect of financial markets,
prediction markets (also called information markets or event futures) are designed
specifically to aggregate information on particular topics of interest [Chen and Pen-
nock, 2007; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Arrow et al., 2008].
In a prediction market setting, participants (traders) make bets via purchasing of
contracts (also called securities). The contracts are defined to represent the unknown
event outcomes and the payoff depends on the unknown future event. The price of
the contracts when the market is in equilibrium condition (discussed in Section 2.2)
generally represents the consensus belief of the participants [Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2006]. Generally the participants interact sequentially (as explained in Section 2.3)
with a central market maker whose function is similar to a book-keeper in sports
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betting and sometimes even among themselves.
Considering a set of N base events, where each event n has Vn different possible
values or values in a continuous range, there can be different measures that a predic-
tion market can be interested in predicting. For example, we might want to predict
the probability of each event, or the joint probabilities, event conditional probabili-
ties, expected values, medians, percentiles, etc. Typical prediction markets that we
see today are interested in predicting one or just a few of measures and mostly con-
sist of binary events or one event with a continuous value range. Some examples
of real-world prediction markets are given below. This shows that prediction mar-
kets are used in many domains (including elections, sports, business, economics and
entertainment industry).
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) : (tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/) Run by the University of
Iowa as an educational and research project, the IEM is a small-scale real-money
online futures market where contract pay-offs are based on real-world events
such as political outcomes, companies’ earnings per share (EPS), and stock
price returns. For most future events (like the U.S. Presidential Elections), they
run two separate markets, a “winner-takes-all” market for predicting a future
event with discrete but mutually certain outcomes (e.g., the Winner-Takes-All
Market to predict whether the Democratic Party nominee or the Republican
Party nominee will receive the popular vote), and for predicting the value of
a continuous variable (e.g., Presidential Vote Share Market to predict the vote
share percentage received by the two parties). A similar election market is run
by the University of British Columbia (http://esm.ubc.ca/forecast.php).
TradeSports : (www.tradesports.com) Was originally a real money market which
traded in a rich set of political futures, financial contracts, current events, sports
and entertainment. Now operates basically as a virtual money market which
offers pre-game and real-time trading for sports events.
Intrade : (www.intrade.com) Used to be a real-money market that allowed to make
predictions on the outcome of binary events using "winner-takes-all" contracts
based on real-world events. Some example markets: The Dow Jones to close
on or above 13,000 on 30 Dec 2012, Barack Obama to be re-elected President in
2012, The United States or Israel to bomb Iran before the end of 2013.
Newsfutures : (www.newsfutures.com/) Earlier used play money (virtual currency)
markets in political, finance, current events, sports, technology and pharmaceu-
tical futures. Now functioning as Lumenogic (www.lumenogic.com), it provides
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prediction market solutions for the business realm.
Economic Derivatives : (www.economicderivatives.com) A large scale real-money mar-
ket run by the Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank for trading in the likely out-
come of future economic data releases such employment, retail sales, industrial
production and business confidence.
Hollywood Stock Exchange : (www.hsx.com) A play money market which predicts
the success of movies, movie stars, awards, including a related set of complex
derivatives and futures.
For more examples for the wide range of applications and success stories of predic-
tion markets see Arrow et al. [2008]; Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2004].
Prediction markets can be thought of as belonging to the more general concept of
crowdsourcing. In crowdsourcing, a principal or crowdsourcer, sets up a problem to be
solved and invites the crowd (the public) to submit solutions. The best solutions
are then owned by the crowdsourcer and the best contributors are sometimes re-
warded. Popular examples are Wikipedia, the Netflix prize competition [Bell and
Koren, 2007], and the DARPA network challenge [DARPA, 2009], which have the
added appeal of being able to tap into the knowledge of the public, encourages
fresh ideas to compete with expert knowledge by removing emotional barriers to
exposure by providing anonymity and provides motivation to participate by offering
recognition, challenge, monetary rewards and helping charitable causes. Despite the
success of these projects, they also have many disadvantages arising from how the
mechanism is set up. In addition to being vulnerable to having participants with
malicious interest or non-interest, it might not be able to attract a “good” pool of
participants or too few participants by the lack of providing suitable incentives to
motivate participation. The requirement to reveal or handing over the ownership of
the winning strategy is also a fact that might hinder potential participants. While
the Wikipedia project allows participants to improve and build off the work of oth-
ers, the Netflix and DARPA models urge competitors to keep their techniques and
findings private and hence leads to an anti-collaborative competition where the work
of the non-winners are wasted. Also a winner-takes-all price structure will lead to
only too few teams participating and a fixed achievement benchmark (like in Netflix
which awarded for a 10% improvement in the Root Mean Squared Error) will have
misaligned incentives [Abernethy and Frongillo, 2011].
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2.1.2 Agents, Trading, and Aggregation
Here I will discuss the similarities and differences of prediction market aggregation
with ensemble methods and motivate why prediction markets may be used for ag-
gregation instead of traditional machine learning ensembles. Similar motivations are
discussed in Storkey [2011].
The main aim of the prediction markets mechanisms we consider is to produce a
probability pi ∈ ∆N representing some “consensus belief” of the market about the
future outcome. Such a mechanism is loosely analogous to an ensemble for a multi-
class probability estimation problem in the machine learning literature (e.g., boost-
ing, random forest aggregations) which aggregates the predictions of several base
predictors.
In a prediction market, traders may be viewed as the base predictors and their be-
liefs may not be directly available as in ensemble methods. Traders interact with the
market via purchasing contracts, instead of directly submitting their beliefs. Now
consider a machine learning aggregation where the base predictors are reluctant to
submit their beliefs for free. Then the need arises to incentivise the base predic-
tors to reveal their information. Prediction markets naturally provide incentives for
participation by the sale of contracts, generally designed to elicit information from
participants (see the discussion on Market Scoring Rules in Section 2.3.2) and are
said to aggregate traders beliefs in to the market price. So prediction markets can
be used for machine learning aggregations where the base predictors are reluctant
to submit their beliefs. By setting up a machine learning aggregation as a prediction
market, we could also invite more participants (humans or machine learning mod-
els) to contribute to the aggregation, thus being able to appeal to the wisdom of the
crowds as in crowdsourcing.
Under the "efficient market hypothesis" prediction markets are said to summarize the
private information held by traders. Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2004, 2006]; Storkey
[2011]; Beygelzimer et al. [2012] show that traders with log utility in a prediction
market produce an aggregation (market price) that is essentially the wealth-weighted
mean belief of the traders. For more connections to machine learning aggregations
and machine learning methods see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.4.
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2.1.3 Contracts and Prices
Here I describe the Arrow Debreu securities [Arrow and Debreu, 1954] and how it
relates to aggregating trader beliefs/probabilities about future events. For complete-
ness, I also give a brief description of other types of contracts. Since traders generally
consider the pricing of contracts when trading, in Section 2.1.3.1 I formalise and give
examples of some pricing functions used in prediction markets.
In order to use a prediction market to predict the outcome of a future event, the
type of contracts that is being traded plays an important role. A winner-takes-all con-
tract costs some amount $p and pays off a fixed amount (e.g.: $1) if and only if a
specific event occurs, like a particular candidate winning an election. The price of a
winner-take-all market represents the market’s expectation of the probability that an
event will occur (assuming risk neutrality) [Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004] (e.g., 2012
US Presidential Election Winner-Takes-All Market in IEM).
The Arrow-Debreu security is the simplest type of contract in prediction markets
for classification. It pays one unit of the traded currency ($1) if a particular state of
the world is reached and zero otherwise, and is therefore a "winner-takes-all" type of
contract. Since we are interested in mechanisms for aggregating trader beliefs about
a single future event with N of possible outcomes, we consider prediction markets
where the “goods” that are traded are N types of contracts – one for each of the N
outcomes – that pay $1 if outcome n ∈ [N] occurs and nothing otherwise.
Although the Winner-takes-all or Arrow-Debreu contracts are generally used for ag-
gregating predictions in the form of probabilities, Lay and Barbu [2011] showed how
Arrow-Debreu contracts can be used in “artificial” prediction markets (that attempts
to mimic a real prediction market in a machine learning setting) for implementing
weighted-mean aggregation, logistic regression and some kernel methods by artifi-
cially controlling how much traders spend on each outcome. See Lay and Barbu
[2012] for use of “artificial” prediction markets for regression (where there are un-
countably many possible outcomes) using contracts whose payoff depends on a re-
ward kernel that rewards contracts based on the distance to the ground truth value.
An index contract is one for which the amount that the contract pays varies in a
continuous way based on a number that rises or falls, like the percentage of the vote
received by a candidate. The price for such a contract represents the mean value E[y]
that the market assigns to the outcome y. But by using non-linear index contracts like
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one that pays according to the square of the index y, the market prices will reveal the
market’s expectation of E[y2] (e.g.: 2012 US Presidential Vote Share Market in IEM).
[Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004]
Also see Abernethy et al. [2011], Abernethy et al. [2013] for a generalised frame-
work for contracts with arbitrary payoff functions and for the design of securities
markets over combinatorial or infinite state or outcome spaces. For introduction to
combinatorial prediction markets, see Hanson [2003] and Chen et al. [2008].
The remainder of this thesis will focus only on Arrow-Debreu contracts.
2.1.3.1 Contract pricing
I will use the following notation. The set {1, . . . , N} will be written as [N] and
∆N := {pi ∈ [0, 1]N : 〈pi, 1〉 = 1} will denote the set of probability distributions over
[N]. Given vectors x, y ∈ RN , their inner product will be denoted 〈x, y〉 := ∑Nn=1 xnyn
and we use 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ RN to denote the vector of all ones. For a dif-
ferentiable function C(x) : RN → R, its derivative at x ∈ RN will be written
∇C(x) :=
(
∂C(x)
∂x1
, . . . , ∂C(x)∂xN
)
.
A common form of trading in markets is based on the assignment of prices to goods.
Since the goods we consider are the contracts on future events, I will use Π : RN → R
to denote a pricing function that assigns a price Π(s) to each contract bundle s ∈ RN .
Each component sn represents the (possibly fractional) number of contracts bought
for outcome n ∈ [N] with sn < 0 representing a sale of −sn contracts. P is used to
denote the set of pricing functions.
A very simple form of pricing function is one that assigns a fixed price pin per unit
contract for outcome n, where pi ∈ ∆N . The price for a bundle s ∈ RN is then given
by Πpi(s) := 〈pi, s〉, which will be called a fixed-price pricing function.
Another type of pricing function that is used when sequential markets are consid-
ered is a cost function-based pricing function. A cost function-based pricing function
is defined by
ΠC,x(s) := C(x + s)− C(x).
This is a shorthand notation for Equation (2.1) in Section 2.3.3 (where we describe
sequential cost function based markets in more detail). The function C can be inter-
preted as assigning a dollar value to every position and the derived pricing function
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charges the difference between the value at position x (which denotes the total num-
ber of contracts sold so far) and the value if the position was moved to x + s. The
value of ∇C(x) can be seen as the price for buying an infinitesimally small bundle at
position x and is therefore called the instantaneous price at x.
One of the most well studied cost function-based pricing functions used in predic-
tion markets is the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) [Hanson, 2007]. This
is defined by the cost function C(x) = b log
(
∑Nn=1 exp(xn/b)
)
where b > 0 is some-
times called the liquidity parameter. The LMSR has instantaneous prices (∇C(x))n =
Z−1 exp(xn/b) where Z = ∑Nn=1 exp(xn/b).
2.1.4 Traders and Demands
I assume that traders make purchases (demands) considering their own beliefs, prices,
etc. depending on the trader model. The work on interpreting sequential markets
as Stochastic Mirror Descent (SMD) and the relation to equilibrium markets in Sec-
tion 3.3 is based on traders making demands satisfying a certain condition called
potential-based demands defined in Section 3.3.2.
A trader’s purchasing behaviour will be modelled through a demand operator d that
reacts to pricing functions. Formally, d : P → RN will return a contract bundle
d(Π) ∈ RN when given a pricing function Π ∈ P . The returned bundle represents
the contracts the trader wishes to buy when bundles are priced according to Π. In
the case of fixed-priced pricing (i.e., Πpi), I abbreviate the demand operator d(Πpi) to
d(pi).
Next I briefly introduce two existing models (MEU and risk-based) that are com-
monly used in prediction markets. These are explored further in Chapter 4. For
completeness I also briefly mention risk-neutral traders. Also see Lay and Barbu
[2010, 2011, 2012] where traders’ demands are defined using a “betting function”
which specifies what percentage of its budget/wealth the trader will allocate to pur-
chase contracts for each contract.
2.1.4.1 Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) traders
A common assumption about traders is that they are risk averse expected utility max-
imisers. That is, their demands are determined by their belief p ∈ ∆N , wealth W ∈ R,
and a concave utility function u : R→ R which measures the value u(m) of $m to the
trader. Traders with concave utility functions u are called risk averse since their utility
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for a guaranteed $ 12 (x + y) is always larger than their expected utility for a coin toss
resulting in $x or $y. They also exhibit diminishing marginal utility of wealth, which
means that there is a decline in the marginal utility that person derives from each
additional unit of wealth (or that the first unit of wealth yields more utility than the
second and subsequent units).
MEU trader model has been widely used in the prediction market literature. Exam-
ples include those by Beygelzimer et al. [2012], Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2006], Storkey
[2011], Storkey et al. [2012], Sethi and Vaughan [2013], that will be discussed in Sec-
tions 2.2 and 2.4. Market mechanisms have also been derived using the expected
utility framework (see Chen and Pennock [2007]’s constant utility market makers).
A more detailed description of MEU traders is given in Section 4.1.1, where I will
analyse MEU traders with respect to the potential-based assumption required for the
main contribution of this thesis.
In a prediction market with Arrow-Debreu contracts representing N possible out-
comes, buying a bundle of s ∈ RN contracts reduces a trader’s wealth by $Π(s) but
will return $sn should outcome n occur. If the trader believes each outcome n will
occur with probability pn (for p ∈ ∆N) then her expected utility for owning the bundle
s is En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]. It is a common assumption that traders make demands
to maximise their expected utility, such that their demand operator is given by:
d(Π) := arg max
s
En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]
The solution to the problem defining the demand operator can be approached using
techniques from optimisation. Here I adopt Jose et al. [2008]’s translation of Goll
and Rüschendorf [2001]’s analysis to the prediction market setting to a situation
where a trader with wealth $W makes demands such that the total cost will not
exceed an arbitrary budget of $B (i.e., 〈pi, s〉 ≤ B)), for a fixed-price pricing function
Πpi(s) := 〈pi, s〉. Since the trader makes demands to maximize his expected utility,
we solve the following Lagrangian problem:
min
λ>0
max
s∈RN
N
∑
n=1
pn.u(W − 〈pi, s〉+ sn)− λ(〈pi, s〉 − B)
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Setting the derivatives (with respect to demands s) to zeros, and using the Lagrangian
condition 〈pi, s〉 = B for λ > 0 we obtain:
∂u
∂sn
(W − B + sn) = ∂u(W − B + sn)
∂(W − B + sn) = λ
pin
pn
Letting I(y) = (∂u)−1(y) (i.e., the inverse function of the gradient of utility), we can
solve for the demand d(Πpi) = d(pi) = s by,
W − B + sn = I
(
λ
pin
pn
)
Using the budget constraint (〈pi, s〉 = B), λ is implicitly uniquely determined by,
N
∑
n=1
pin I
(
λ
pin
pn
)
= W.
Also note that the trader’s budget B does not affect the resulting expected utility
(i.e., En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)] = En∼p
[
u
(
I
(
λpinpn
))]
), even though it creates mul-
tiple possible demands depending on the budget. In Section 4.1.1, a standardization
constraint such that B = W is adopted to avoid having to deal with multiple solutions.
Another term related to MEU is the Certainty Equivalent (CE) of holding a bun-
dle s, CE(s) : RN → R which returns a wealth w that would give the same ex-
pected utility as the bundle s (s.t. u(w) = En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]), so CE(s) =
(u)−1(En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]). For utility functions defined as in Section 4.1.1, the
MEU problem is also equivalent to finding a bundle s that would maximise the cer-
tainty equivalent (i.e., d(Π) := arg maxs CE(s)). The Risk Premium of a bundle s is
the difference between the expected wealth of holding s and the Certainty Equivalent
(i.e., En∼p [W −Π(s) + sn] − CE(s)), which is positive by definition for risk averse
traders.
One of the most common examples of MEU demand operators is for logarithmic util-
ity u(m) := log(m), which always requires wealth to be non-negative (m > 0). Log
utility based traders make (positive) demands dn(pi) = W.(pn/pin) (when spending
their entire wealth W) which also makes intuitive sense since demands are propor-
tional to the belief/price ratio. Refer Table 3.1 for other examples.
The Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) Utility is a general class of utilities that
are commonly used in practice and widely studied in economics. See Appendix A
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for connections of HARA utilities to divergences and scoring rules by Jose et al.
[2008]. The HARA utility u(m) = 1β−1
(
(b + βam)
β−1
β − 1
)
(for a > 0) is defined
on the domain b + βam ≥ 0 with strict inequality for β ≤ 1. HARA is a general
class of utilities that include the popular quadratic (when β = −1), linear (β → ∞),
square-root (β = 2) , log (β → 1), reciprocal (β = 1/2), iso-elastic (power) (β > 0 and
b=0) and exponential negative decay (β→ 0) utilities. β is considered as a risk-tolerance
parameter of the utility1 [Jose et al., 2008; Chen and Pennock, 2007]. The iso-elastic
utility (u(m) = 1β−1
(
m
β−1
β − 1
)
) is also called Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
utility since it’s risk aversion is βm, so the risk aversion relative to the wealth is β
(constant). The exponential negative decay utility (u(m) = − exp(−r.m) for r > 0) is
also called Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility since its risk aversion is r,
which is constant with respect to wealth.
Note that the parameters I have adopted for HARA here and in later chapters is
compatible with the notation used in Jose et al. [2008] who consider a special case
of HARA called Linear Risk Tolerance (LRT) utility by using a=1 and b=1. To avoid
confusion with other work that concern prediction markets, I note the following
other parametrisations. Chen and Pennock [2007] use a parameter γ (which is a risk-
averseness parameter2 ) which translates to the current setting as γ = 1β . Storkey et al.
[2012] use a parameter η for iso-elastic utilities that is compatible with η = γ = 1β .
Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2006] and Hu and Storkey [2014] use a different parametrisa-
tion with γ that translates to the current setting as 11−γ = β.
2.1.4.2 Risk Neutral traders
Risk neutral traders (as opposed to risk averse traders) are also a common assump-
tion in prediction markets. Risk neutral traders arise from HARA utilities when
β → ∞ or η = γ = 0, resulting in Linear utility u(m) = b + am, which are called
risk neutral since their utility for a guaranteed $ 12 (x + y) is always the same for their
expected utility3 for a fair coin toss resulting in $x or $y. Also note that the Risk Pre-
mium for risk neutral traders is zero, meaning that the expected wealth of holding a
bundle s is always equal to the Certainty Equivalent of the bundle s.
1where risk tolerance Γ(m) is defined as the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion measure
(−∂2u(m)/∂u(m)), so Γ(m) = (b + βam)/a for HARA utilities, so the risk aversion is a hyperbolic
function of wealth (hence the name Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion).
2The risk-aversion measure for HARA utilities is −∂2u(m)/∂u(m) = a/(b + βam) = a/(b +
(am)/γ), so risk aversion increases as γ increases.
3note that their risk tolerance measure is infinite (Γ(m) = limβ→∞(b + βam)/a) = ∞, meaning zero
risk averseness, hence called risk neutral
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The assumption of risk neutral traders is a key assumption in Market Scoring Rules
designed by Hanson [2007], where it is assumed that risk neutral traders move the
market prices to their own beliefs (see Section 2.3.2). This typically assumes that
the traders are not restricted by wealth when trading. Risk neutral traders are also
used in prediction markets with wealth restrictions (see [Manski, 2006; Storkey, 2011;
Othman and Sandholm, 2010]).
2.1.4.3 Convex Risk Based Traders
Even though the MEU framework is widely used, there has also been arguments
regarding the rationality of a trader adopting the utility maximising (MEU) concept.
For example, Yaari [1987] points out that it may be desirable to separate the notions
of risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility of wealth from each other, where it be-
comes synonymous under expected utility theory.
Also behaviour patterns which are inconsistent with expected utility theory have
been observed in practice. For e.g., even though Full Kelly Betting is viewed as con-
sistent with utility theory (for traders maximising log utility), Fractional Kelly Betting
is commonly used in practice, where only a part of a trader’s wealth is used to pur-
chase contracts mainly to avoid the high volatility of Kelly betting and to safeguard
against inaccurate beliefs. Beygelzimer et al. [2012] view Fractional Kelly Betting as
equivalent to Full Kelly Betting with revised beliefs (considering the market prices)
with a Bayesian justification 4.
Convex risk measure based traders is an alternative trader model to MEU. Formally,
a convex risk measure [Föllmer and Schied, 2004] satisfies convexity, monotonicity
and translation invariance (discussed in Section 4.2) and has a form
ρ(x) = sup
q∈∆N
{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)}
where α(q) is a penalty function defined on the domain q ∈ ∆N . See Hu and Storkey
[2014] for use of convex risk measure based traders in prediction markets, where
traders make demands to minimise their risk measure. In Section 4.2, I give a more
detailed discussion of convex risk based traders and it’s relation to potential-based
demands.
4it would be interesting to find out whether fractional Kelly betting is connected to the convex risk
measures introduced in this section.
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Convex risk measures have also been derived using the utility framework (see Föllmer
and Schied [2004]). One notable special case is the exponential negative decay utility,
u(m) = − exp(−r.m). The negative of its Certainty Equivalent for MEU demands is
the well-studied entropic risk measure
ρ(x) = sup
q∈∆N
{〈q,−x〉 − 1
r
DKL(q; p)}
where r > 0 and DKL(p; q) = ∑Nn=1 pn. ln(pn/qn) is the KL divergence. This can
be obtained by solving for MEU demands d(Πq) = x, with trader beliefs p and
prices pi = q, which results in xn = 1r ln(pn/qn) +W +
1
r .DKL(q; p) (when the trader
spends his total wealth i.e., 〈q, x〉 = W), and then calculating the CE of X which
gives CE(X) = (u)−1(En∼p [u(xn)]) = −[〈q,−x〉 − 1r DKL(q; p)]. For now assume
pi = q = arg supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − 1r DKL(q; p)}. Applying exponential negative decay
utility to our Collorary 1 given in Chapter 4, we get that pi = q is indeed the max-
imising argument as assumed here.
So we can view traders with exponential negative decay utility as belonging to both
MEU and risk-based trader models (since minimising -CE is equivalent to maximis-
ing MEU). Thus it becomes interesting to verify whether the results obtained using
exponential negative decay utility based traders using the MEU model (as in Aber-
nethy et al. [2014]) could be extended to prediction markets using risk based traders.
2.2 Equilibrium prediction markets
For a prediction market in which traders buy and sell Arrow-Debreu contracts, and
when traders make demands to maximise their expected utilities, we say that the pre-
diction market is in (Walrasian) equilibrium when supply equals demand [Wolfers
and Zitzewitz, 2006]. The price for which supply equals demands is called the equi-
librium price. So the market equilibrium is defined in terms of both the equilibrium
price and demands of the traders in response to equilibrium prices.
When there are multiple outcomes, the equilibrium is generalised as the condition
for which the total demands for each contract is equal to the total spendings of the
traders [Lay and Barbu, 2010, 2011; Storkey, 2011; Storkey et al., 2012], resulting in a
total wealth conservation property since the total wealth of the market is conserved
irrespective of the outcome that occurs. This means that for K traders with demands
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d1, . . . , dK, and for a market with N outcomes trading in Arrow-Debreu contracts
representing each outcome, the equilibrium price pi∗ satisfies,
∀n ∈ [N],
K
∑
k=1
dkn(pi
∗) =
K
∑
k=1
〈pi∗, dk(pi∗)〉
A more detailed discussion of equilibrium is deferred to Section 3.1.1.
Market equilibrium is also the classical market analysis technique used in economics.
Consider a market which sells a particular “good”. Typically it is assumed that the
constant interaction of buyers and sellers enable a price to emerge over time, so that
supply equals demand and thus there is no surplus or shortage of goods, thus effi-
cient. This single price which brings demand and supply into balance, is called the
equilibrium price or market clearing price. Note that this equilibrium price changes
if there is a change in supply or demand. However, the market prices prior to emer-
gence may be far off from the equilibrium prices, which may also be the case in
prediction markets. Understanding this difference is one of the main motivations of
this dissertation.
Even though most empirical analysis of prediction markets treat prices of binary
outcome contracts as predictions of the probability of future events, this was recently
challenged by Manski [2006] who showed that the equilibrium prices resulting from
linear utility maximising (or risk neutral) traders does not correspond with the mean
beliefs of the traders (he in fact showed that the equilibrium price corresponds with
a particular quantile of the budget-weighted distribution of traders beliefs). This was
initially answered by Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2006] incorporating risk-averse traders
as opposed to risk neutral traders. They show that in a binary outcome prediction
market, if the traders are MEU traders with log utility and the same initial wealth, the
equilibrium price coincides with the average belief of the traders (similar to the ran-
dom forest aggregation), and that if the wealth is correlated with the beliefs, then the
equilibrium prediction market price is equal to the wealth-weighted average beliefs
(similar to boosting aggregation).
2.2.1 Equilibrium market connections to Machine Learning
Several recent papers have studied the equilibrium prices of prediction markets con-
sisting of so-called “artificial” traders with known utilities and beliefs derived from
predictions of machine learning algorithms. Storkey [2011] and Storkey et al. [2012]
show that the equilibrium prices of these artificial markets replicate well-known ag-
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gregations from machine learning. Using MEU traders, they extend the results of
Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2006] to multiple outcome markets, showing that,
• the equilibrium price with log utility based MEU traders result in the wealth-
weighted-mean belief aggregation
• linear utilities result in wealth-weighted-medians,
• exponential negative decay utilities result in product-model combinations such
as log opinion pools or geometric means and
• iso-elastic utilities result in (implicitly weighted) entropic means or α-mixtures.
Also note that in the convex optimisation literature, these aggregations (except the
weighted-median) relate to minimisations of divergence-based distances [Ben-Tal
et al., 1989; Amari, 2007]. For example if there are [K] participants with beliefs
pk ∈ ∆N and weights wk ∈ R+,
• The aggregation pi ∈ ∆N that would minimise ∑Kk=1 wk.DKL(pk;pi) is the w-
weighted-mean belief 5, i.e., pin = ∑Kk=1 w
k.pkn. Storkey [2011] shows that weights
w correspond to the traders’ wealths W in the case of log utility based traders.
• Similarly, arg minpi∈∆N ∑Kk=1 wk.DKL(pi; pk) is the geometric mean,
i.e., pin = c.{exp(∑Kk=1 wk. ln(pkn))}(∑
K
k=1 w
k) where c is a normalization con-
stant. When the traders have exponential negative decay utilities (u(m) =
− exp(−r.m)), the weights w correspond with 1r of each trader. Storkey [2011]
considers the case where traders are homogeneous, (i.e., all having the same
identical utility u(m) = − exp(−m) with r = 1 for all traders).
• And arg minpi∈∆N ∑Kk=1 wk.DPβ (pk;pi) is the w-weighted entropic mean,6
i.e., pin = {∑Kk=1 wk.(pkn)β}(1/β) (also called an α-mixture, for α = 1 − 2β).
Storkey et al. [2012] show that when traders have iso-elastic utility(
u(m) = 1β−1
(
m
β−1
β − 1
))
, each weight wk corresponds with an implicit weight
given by W
k
Zk , where Z
k = ∑Nn=1 pin.
(
pkn/pin
)β and Wk is the wealth of trader k.
Further Storkey et al. [2012] show that prediction markets can produce novel ag-
gregations by allowing traders with inhomogeneous (different) utilities. By using
iso-elastic traders with different parameters of β (or α), they note that the resulting
5where DKL(p;pi) = ∑Nn=1 pn. ln(pn/pin) is the KL divergence
6where DPβ (p;pi) =
∑Nn=1 pin .(pn/pin)
β−1
β(β−1) for β > 0 are the power divergences, which correspond with
an α-divergence Dα(p;pi) = 4/(1− α2){1−∑Nn=1(pn/pin)
1−α
2 pin} when α = 1− 2β (see Appendix A)
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equilibrium extends the α-mixtures formalism.
Lay and Barbu [2010, 2011] also use artificial prediction markets to obtain the weighted-
mean aggregation and implement kernel methods, logistic regressions from traders
who use betting functions.
Beygelzimer et al. [2012] show that binary outcome prediction markets with Kelly
betters (log utility based traders) redistribute trader wealths according to Bayesian
law once the outcome of the market is known, which Storkey et al. [2012] generalize
to the class of iso-elastic utility based traders (see Section 2.5).
Even though equilibrium prediction markets have nice connections to machine learn-
ing as discussed above, calculating the equilibrium price is always not straightfor-
ward (e.g., as shown by Storkey et al. [2012] the equilibrium price of an iso-elastic
market is implicitly dependent on itself, requiring an iterative algorithm to calcu-
late the equilibrium price). See Vazirani [2007] for a brief summary of processes to
solve for market equilibrium including convex optimisation approaches and auction
processes. There is work in Economics and Finance which develop on the idea of
tatonnement (see Cole and Fleischer [2007], Fleischer et al. [2008]) to compute equi-
librium prices. Work from Physics include Tseng et al. [2010] which examine the
statistical properties of market agent models.
Equilibrium markets typically use some kind of off-equilibrium trading process that
eventually converges to a point (i.e., equilibrium) whose properties are studied.
Computational viewpoints to equilibrium computation match to dynamic processes,
which could be constructed as a choice of market dynamic, and hence are relevant
to this thesis. This thesis provides such a process, taking care to identify the un-
derlying behavioral model. The algorithmic and equilibrium analyses are therefore
complementary to each other.
2.3 Sequential Market Making
In real-world prediction markets, traders must interact sequentially and so many
mechanisms for sequential trading have been examined (e.g., double actions, etc.),
most of which suffer from the problems of thin market and irrational participation
problems (see Section 2.3.1). In the case of prediction markets, scoring rule based
sequential market makers introduced by Hanson (see Section 2.3.2), have received a
lot of recent study due to their practicality, theoretical characterisations, and connec-
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tions with machine learning. It has been shown by Chen and Pennock [2007] that
these are equivalent to cost-function based sequential market makers (described in
Section 2.3.3) which is the focus of the rest of this thesis. In Section 2.3.4, I briefly
mention some important results that connect cost-function based markets with ma-
chine learning. For completeness I mention some other types of sequential markets
with market makers (in Section 2.3.5).
2.3.1 The need for a market maker
Most popular prediction markets such as the Iowa Electronic market operate as a
continuous double auction. In continuous double auctions which are commonly
found in modern stock markets, the buyers submit bids (buy orders) and sellers sub-
mit asks (sell orders) for a certain quantity and a trade takes place whenever the two
sides match and any outstanding quantities are maintained in an order book, where
the incoming orders typically have price/time priority. One problem in information
markets of this form is the thin market problem. Even though there might be an ex-
ponential number of contracts available to trade, traders might only be interested in
trading on a certain limited set of contracts of which they are knowledgeable about.
Since placing an order (bet) will reveal their personal beliefs, orders that wait a long
time to be accepted might be at a potential disadvantage. For these reasons, for a
trade to occur, traders must coordinate on the contracts they must trade and when
they must trade. So even if one participant possesses some information about a par-
ticular event (contract), if no one else is interested, that information will be wasted
because the participant will not be able to announce his beliefs [Hanson, 2003].
Another problem is the irrational participation problem, where rational participants
will not want to trade with each other after hedging their risks even if they hold pri-
vate information, as explained by the no trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey [1982]
for zero-sum games because the rational agents are aware that a potential profit will
only come from another traders loss, and hence no one will be willing to agree on a
trade. This is not seen in real markets which show high levels of speculative activity
may be due to widespread irrationality or due to people using bets to signal their
expertise to observers [Hanson, 2003]. For example the screen-shot of an Intrade’s
market (Figure: 2.1) on where basketball free agent LeBron James will sign (taken on
2010/07/07), shows how the prediction market becomes unable to predict the event
when the above problems are present ("The market says there is between a 42% and
70% chance James will sign with Cleveland, between a 5% and 40% chance he will
sign with Chicago, etc.") [Pennock, 2010].
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Figure 2.1: Screen-shot of an Intrade’s market (from [Pennock, 2010])
The introduction of an automated market maker who is always willing to buy and
sell every outcome at some price aims to remove these problems by allowing traders
to trade any contract at any time. Even though the market maker stands to bear
some loss, it is thought to be well compensated since the motive is to make predic-
tions rather than to profit [Hanson, 2003; Pennock, 2010]. In many existing markets,
all trades are done with one or more few central market makers and have been
adopted in information markets (for e.g., the use of automated market makers in the
Hollywood Stock Exchange) [Hanson, 2007].
2.3.2 Market Scoring Rules (MSR)
The sequential market mechanism called Market Scoring Rules (MSR) introduced by
Hanson [2003] is based on an automated market maker who uses scoring rules and
solves the above problems inherent in sequential markets, thus encourages trading.
Here I give a brief overview of MSR markets and the use of scoring rules to elicit
trader beliefs.
Scoring rules are a measure of the quality of probabilistic predictions. Suppose a
forecaster assigns probabilities to multiple outcomes N and gives a report vector
r ∈ RN . A scoring rule defines the payout sn(r), if the nth outcome occurred. Use
of a proper scoring rule (which maximizes the expected score for well calibrated
probability assessments) as the payoff function will incentivise the forecaster to re-
port his true private beliefs (p). For example if the scoring rule sn(r) determines
the cash amount to be paid for report r for outcome n ∈ [N], the expected payoff
will be ∑Nn=1 pn.sn(r). If the scoring rule is strictly proper, the agent can maximise
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the expected payoff only by reporting his true belief (p) in the report (assuming risk
neutral traders i.e., traders with linear utility). Some examples of proper scoring
rules for reported vector r ∈ RN and outcome probability vector p ∈ RN are given
in Table 2.1. For unnormalized r (i.e. ∑Nn=1 rn 6= 1), the scoring rules can be extended
for a normalized r by using ri/∑Nn=1 rn for ri [Hanson, 2007]. See Jose et al. [2008]
and Chen and Pennock [2007] for more examples including weighted power and
pseudo-spherical scores (also given in Appendix A ).
Table 2.1: Proper Scoring Rule Examples [Hanson, 2007]
Scoring Rule Payoff for outcome n ∈ [N] Notes
Logarithmic sn(r) = an + b. log(rn) Special case of power law rule
when α = 1 and only depen-
dent on the probability report
for outcome n
Quadratic sn(r) = an + 2brn − b.〈r, r〉 Special case of power law rule
when α = 2
Brier sn(r) = 1− (ρn − rn)2 The original Brier score
[Brier, 1950] which can be
derived from the quadratic
scoring rule
Power Law sn(r) = an + b.α.
∫ rn
0 p
α−2
n dρn − b∑Nn=1 rαn Proper when α ≥ 1
Spherical sn(r) = an + b.rn/(〈r, r〉)1/2
Scoring rules do not suffer from the irrational participation and thin market prob-
lems, but they have the problem of being unable to produce a single consensus when
different people give differing estimates, known as the thick market problem. [Hanson,
2003]
Market Scoring Rules (MSR) are in essence sequentially shared scoring rules that ad-
dress the thick market problem. It is used by an automated market maker where
a trader can change the current published report (prices) of the market, and be
paid according to the new report, as long as he agrees to pay the last trader ac-
cording to his report. For any proper scoring rule sn(r), if the trader changed the
published distribution from p to r, he should accept a (net) payment of the form
∆sn(r, p) = sn(r)− sn(p) for outcome n. When there is only one trader, the market
scoring rule reduces to a simple proper scoring rule which will elicit a true probabil-
ity estimate from the trader [Hanson, 2003].
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The most popular example of MSR markets is the LMSR (Logarithmic Market Scor-
ing Rule) which uses the Logarithmic scoring rule (sn(r) = an + b. log(rn)). LMSR is
used by a number of companies including Inkling Markets, Consensus Point, Yahoo!
and Microsoft.
Thus the market scoring rules provide incentives for truthful revelation and the se-
quential nature of the use of the scoring rule also solves the irrational participation
problem seen in prediction markets because traders can always adjust the published
report and be paid according to a proper scoring rule. The introduction of an au-
tomated maker also solves the thin market problem, because traders can trade with
the market maker at any time, so the need to match trades is eliminated. This over-
comes the problems of prediction markets and allows to incorporate the information
of even a solitary trader [Chen and Pennock, 2007]. It also solves the thick market
(information aggregation) problem of scoring rules since the traders share the scor-
ing rule. Thus it has the combined advantages of scoring rules and the information
aggregation characteristic of prediction markets [Hanson, 2003].
In traditional markets, market makers are human decision makers seeking to earn a
profit (while also providing more liquidity), but in a prediction market the role of the
market maker is to elicit information from the traders (by providing incentives), pro-
vide liquidity (encourage and facilitate trading) and price discovery (aggregation),
so he is expected to lose some money in the process [Chen and Pennock, 2007].
If the market maker published his initial beliefs r0, and there were T subsequent
updates before the outcome was revealed to be n, the total loss for the market maker
would be ∑Tt=1(sn(rt)− sn(rt−1) = sn(rT)− sn(r0). The market maker incurs the max-
imum loss when the final probability estimate (rT) assigns probability 1 to the true
outcome, thus the market maker has bounded worst case loss. So in the case of a
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) using sn(r) = an + b. log(rn), the maxi-
mum expected loss for the market maker would be the entropy, −b∑Nn=1 r0n log(r0n)
of the initial distribution r0, with b representing the liquidity of the market [Hanson,
2007]. If the market maker started by publishing a uniform distribution (as r0), then
his worst case loss is bounded by b. log(N) in the case of a logarithmic scoring rule
and by (N−1)
b
N for a quadratic scoring rule (for N discrete outcomes) [Chen and Pen-
nock, 2007].
Even though the MSR assumes that traders update the market prices to reflect their
own beliefs, Hanson [2003] has also outlined how this setup can be implemented in
§2.3 Sequential Market Making 26
a prediction market framework with an automated market maker who determines
fair prices for the contracts for an infinitesimal amount of trade and who will accept
any finite fair bet that is an integral of such infinitesimal trades. Here the traders are
asked to give their opinion (in the form of a report r) and the change of contracts
required to change the current report is decided accordingly.
2.3.3 Cost-function based sequential markets (CSM)
Chen and Pennock [2007] have showed that Hanson’s LMSR is equivalent to an au-
tomated market maker implementing a cost function C(x) = b. log(∑Nn=1 exp(xn/b)
for the current amount of contracts sold (x) and b > 0 in a prediction market setting.
Here the traders express interest in trading some particular amounts of contracts,
instead of directly reporting their beliefs. In cost function based sequential markets
(CSM) using a convex, differentiable function C : RN → R, a trader has to pay an
amount C(xt+1) − C(xt) if he updated the current contract position of the market
(total contracts sold so far) to xt+1 from xt (by purchasing xt+1 − xt ∈ RN amount
of contracts). The price of a bundle of contracts depend on the change of contract
position in the market, and the cost function C keeps track of the total amount of
money the traders have spent so far. The value of ∇C(x) can be seen as the price
for buying an infinitesimally small bundle at position x and is therefore called the
instantaneous price at x (denoted by pi). For e.g., the LMSR has instantaneous prices
pii =
exp(xi/b)
∑Nn=1 exp(xn/b)
.
Chen and Pennock [2007] show equivalent relations and how to translate between
CSM and MSR markets and also between another type of market (namely Constant
Utility based Market Makers briefly mentioned in Section 2.3.5). Agrawal et al. [2011]
further analyse this and give conditions for which these relations hold.
Formally, CSM markets use a sequential pricing mechanism Π(·|s1, . . . , sT) ∈ P which
is a function from histories of bundle purchases s1, . . . , sT for any number of trades
T to pricing functions. Specifically,
ΠC,x
0
(s|s1, . . . , st) = C(xt + s)− C(xt), where xt = x0 +
t
∑
i=1
si. (2.1)
A natural constraint on sequential pricing mechanisms is that it is path independent,
that is, Π(s+ s′|s1, . . . , st) = Π(s|s1, . . . , st, s′)+Π(s′|s1, . . . , st) for all bundles s, s′ and
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histories s1, . . . , st. Theorem 1 of Abernethy et al. [2011] show that all path indepen-
dent sequential pricing mechanisms are necessarily the cost function-based pricing
functions (briefly mentioned in Section 2.1.3.1).
If the cost function defines instantaneous prices ∇C(x) ∈ ∆N for all x, this ensures
that the prices set by a cost function are probabilities and cannot be arbitraged (i.e., if
the prices summed to something less than (respectively, greater than) 1, then a trader
could buy (respectively, sell) small equal quantities of each security for a guaranteed
profit) [Chen and Vaughan, 2010]. Also see the related discussion in Section 3.3.3.
Chen and Vaughan [2010] note that convex cost functions which defines instanta-
neous prices in the N-simplex can be represented in a similar form to the convex risk
measures (briefly introduced in Section 2.1.4.3)
C(x) = sup
pi∈∆N
{〈pi, x〉 − α(pi)} (2.2)
where α : ∆N → (∞,∞] is a convex, lower semi continuous function referred to as a
penalty function and arg suppi∈∆N{〈pi, x〉 − α(pi)} is the instantaneous prices ∇C(x) of
the market.
Abernethy et al. [2011] define generalised cost functions using a duality based rep-
resentation (see Section 3.2.1) where the instantaneous prices are not restricted to be
in the N-simplex by defining contracts with arbitrary payoff functions (in addition
to the standard Arrow-Debreu contracts). They show that the range of the instanta-
neous prices is the domain of the dual function. We adopt this duality based cost
function representation for the rest of the thesis, particularly in Chapter 3, where
we relate sequential price updates with the dual representation of price updates in
stochastic mirror descent (see Section 3.2.2).
2.3.4 CSM connections to Machine Learning
Sequential cost function based markets have many connections with the learning-
from-expert-advice setup. First they are known to have the property of bounded
loss for the market maker, which is similar to regret analysis in online learning
algorithms. The worst-case loss of the maker depends on the maximum payment
that the market maker may have to pay to the traders, i.e., maxn∈1,...,N{(xTn − x0n)−
∑Tt=1(C(xt) − C(xt−1))} = maxn∈1,...,N{(xTn − x0n) − (C(xT) − C(x0))}, if the market
was initialised with the initial contract position x0 and the market ended with the
final position xT after T rounds of trading. So (xTn − x0n) represents the money that
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the market maker has to pay if outcome n was the winning outcome, and (C(xT)−
C(x0)) is the total money collected by the market maker during trading. For CSM
markets which are related to an MSR representation, this property will be naturally
inherited from the MSR markets. Chen and Vaughan [2010] show that in the case
of cost functions which defines prices in the N-simplex, the worst-case loss bound is
defined in terms of the penalty function by {suppi∈∆N α(pi)−minpi∈∆N α(pi)}. Simi-
larly for generalised cost functions as in Abernethy et al. [2011] the worst-case loss
of the market makers is bounded using the conjugate dual of the cost function (see
Section 5.1.2).
Chen and Vaughan [2010] show how CSM markets can be used to implement follow-
the-regularized-leader and achieve no-regret learning. Thus the role of the market-
maker becomes much like an algorithm for learning from expert advice. Abernethy
et al. [2011] notes further connections between the price update mechanisms in se-
quential markets and weight update mechanisms in follow-the-regularized-leader
algorithms.
Frongillo et al. [2012] showed that the price updates of CSM markets replicate Stochas-
tic Mirror Descent when certain conditions are satisfied. Chapter 3 of this thesis
builds on their work in order to relate sequential markets with equilibrium mar-
kets (by interpreting both markets as minimising an objective similar to machine
learning aggregations). Hu and Storkey [2014] also showed that sequential markets
minimise an objective that is related to machine learning aggregation problems us-
ing risk measure based traders. In Section 2.4 I will discuss the existing work which
relates sequential and equilibrium markets, which is the focus of this thesis.
2.3.5 Other types of Sequential Market making
Even though we consider CSM markets in this thesis, I now briefly summarise other
variants of sequential markets with automated market makers. First Chen and Pen-
nock [2007] showed that market makers who maintain a constant utility (Constant
Utility based Market Makers) are related to MSR and CSM markets as given in Fig-
ure 2.2. Here the market maker attempts to maintain a constant utility of money
(∑Nn=1 pi
0
nu(mtn) = k) where pi0 is the market marker’s initial belief and mtn corre-
sponds to C(xt) − xtn (the total money left after making pay-off’s) at any stage of
trading t ∈ [T] in the equivalent CSM market. In order to maintain constant utility,
the market maker accepts infinitesimal quantities of trades at his risk-neutral prices
(i.e., instantaneous prices) defined by piti =
pi0i ∂u(m
t
i )
∑Nn=1 pi0n∂u(mtn)
.
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Figure 2.2: Market Maker Equivalence Relations (Diagram from [Chen and Pennock,
2007])
Later in Chapter 4, we observe that Constant Utility based Market Makers main-
tain an objective that is similar to traders with Utility based convex risk measures
(see Section 4.2.1.1).
Othman et al. [2010] define a variant of Cost function based markets to avoid the
market maker coming to a loss by relaxing the no-arbitrage condition (i.e., which
requires that prices sum to one). Pennock [2004] designed a sequential market which
is hybrid between a pari-mutuel market and a continuous double auction.
The SCPM (Sequential Convex Pari-mutuel Mechanism) model of Agrawal et al.
[2011] presents a unified convex optimization framework for constructing prediction
market mechanisms. They show how to convert arbitrage-free cost function based
markets to the equivalent SCPM model and show a strong equivalence between the
SCPM and the market scoring rule markets. Moreover they show that the SCPM
strictly subsumes the class of proper scoring rule mechanisms and the utility-based
market maker model.
2.4 Relating equilibrium and sequential prediction markets
As discussed in Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.3.4 both equilibrium markets and CSM
markets have interesting connections to machine learning. If we were to use predic-
tion markets for machine learning aggregations, we see that equilibrium prediction
markets more closely relate to machine learning aggregations. However due to the
difficulties in the practical use of prediction markets, it may be worthwhile to explore
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whether sequential markets can be used for this task.
One of the first works in relating sequential (CSM) and equilibrium markets is by
Frongillo et al. [2012] who showed that the “stationary price” of sequential predic-
tion markets (where there will be no price update to the market considering the
expectation with respect to trader demands) reach equilibrium market prices under
limiting conditions and certain assumptions. This can be considered as an extension
of the result by Othman and Sandholm [2010] who showed that under a random par-
ticipation model, steady state prices equal those of the equilibrium prediction market
model considering wealth restricted risk neutral traders. Frongillo et al. [2012] also
show that when traders’ demands have a particular form, sequential markets per-
form a stochastic mirror descent (SMD).
In Chapter 3, we show that when traders make potential-based demands (which
is a generalisation of the assumption on demands made by Frongillo et al. [2012]),
CSM markets perform a SMD for the same objective function as is minimised by the
equilibrium price. So the potential-based assumption allows to relate sequential and
equilibrium markets without having to rely on limiting conditions as in Frongillo
et al. [2012]. Also the interpretation as SMD motivates us to design “mini-trading”
as a mechanism for implementing a parameter similar to a learning rate parameter,
thus giving a mechanism to reach equilibrium prices using CSM markets.
Sethi and Vaughan [2013] also showed that sequential market prices are convergent
in “multi-period markets” where MEU traders are allowed to repeatedly improve
their objective as opposed to mini-trading. They show convergence to a weighted
average of trader beliefs using numerical methods. Hu and Storkey [2014] show that
risk-measure based traders in multi-period markets minimise the dual objective of
the usual machine learning aggregation problem, if sequential prices converge. Even
though their result does not make much assumptions about the traders’ demands, it
is not clear how and when sequential prices converge. On the other hand, assum-
ing that traders make potential-based demands and using “mini-trading” instead of
“multi-period markets” provide a mechanism (via SMD) for sequential prices to con-
verge to equilibrium prices. In Section 4.2, I will relate risk-measure based traders
with potential-based demands.
Abernethy et al. [2014] also show convergence with MEU traders with exponential
negative decay utilities and exponential family beliefs in multi-period markets. As
discussed in Section 2.1.4.3, exponential negative decay utilities can be considered as
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the intersection of MEU and risk based trader models. Therefore it becomes inter-
esting to verify whether the Abernethy et al. [2014] result can be extended to general
risk measure based traders, which would give a convergence guarantee to the risk-
measure based trader model in multi-period markets (i.e., the model considered by
Hu and Storkey [2014]).
Chen et al. [2007], Dimitrov and Sami [2008] and Chen et al. [2009] also give con-
vergence and non-convergence properties of MSR market prices to “Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium” (which is different from the Walrasian equilibrium considered in this
thesis). They consider strategic play by traders and situations where traders receive
different information.
2.5 Repeated markets
Finally, I survey what is known about the dynamics of repeated equilibrium mar-
kets and the interpretation of Bayesian wealth updates in equilibrium markets. In
Chapter 5, I will present preliminary work that relates wealth updates in sequen-
tial markets (with mini-trading) to wealth updates in equilibrium markets and open
questions about repeated sequential markets.
Consider a setup of repeated predictions (like a series of weather predictions) where
equilibrium markets are run for each prediction instance and the traders are paid
off when the outcome of the current prediction is known, before moving on to the
next prediction instance. This would mean that traders will have an updated wealth
before moving on to the next prediction. The following results show that equilibrium
prediction markets perform Bayesian wealth updates for the traders.
Beygelzimer et al. [2012] show that in binary outcome prediction markets with Kelly
betters (log utility based MEU traders), the equilibrium market redistributes traders’
wealth according to Bayesian law when the outcome of the market is known. Note
that a Log utility trader make demands W.(pn/pi∗n) spending his entire wealth W,
given beliefs p and equilibrium prices pi∗ (adopting the notation for multiple out-
come markets as in Section 2.1.4.1). Since he spends his entire wealth, if outcome
y = i ∈ [N] occurs, his wealth would be updated to W.(pi/pi∗i ). Plugging in the
equilibrium prices pi∗n = ∑
K
k=1 W
k.pkn (which is the wealth-weighted mean beliefs),
we get that for trader j ∈ [K], wealth would be updated to W j.p
j
i
∑Kk=1 Wk .p
k
i
if outcome
y = i occurs. This corresponds with a Bayesian wealth update for the trader, so
that the posterior probability of choosing the trader j in Bayesian model averag-
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ing is P(j|y = i) = P(y=i|j).P(j)P(y=i) =
W j.pji
∑Kk=1 Wk .p
k
i
(if the prior probability of trader j is
P(j) = W j/(∑Kk=1 W
k) and the likelihood of outcome given trader is P(y = i|j) = pki ).
Storkey et al. [2012] generalize this result to the class of iso-elastic utility based MEU
traders, using the “effective belief” of traders as the likelihood of outcome given a
particular trader. Considering the form of demands in the case of iso-elastic utility
based MEU traders, the “effective belief” of a trader is considered as a belief adjust-
ment by a trader considering his own beliefs and the market prices. The demands of
an iso-elastic trader is given by dn(pi∗) =
W(pn/pi∗n)
β
∑Nn=1 pi∗n.(pn/pi∗n)
β (when the trader spends his
entire wealth for trading), which can be written as dn(pi∗) = W.(En(pi∗)/pi∗n), where
En(pi∗) = (
pn/pi∗n)
β.pi∗n
∑Nn=1 pi∗n.(pn/pi∗n)
β ∈ ∆N is considered as the “effective belief” of a trader
[Storkey et al., 2012].
Further, the equilibrium price for iso-elastic traders can also be written as a wealth-
weighted mean of “effective beliefs” of traders [Storkey et al., 2012], i.e., the equi-
librium price pi∗n = {∑Kk=1 W
k
Zk .(p
k
n)
β}(1/β), where Zk = ∑Nn=1 qkn.
(
pkn/qkn
)β can be re-
written as pi∗n = ∑
K
k=1 W
k.Ekn(pi∗). So the wealth updates and market prices in case
of iso-elastic traders correspond with Bayesian wealth updates and Bayesian model
averaging when the “effective beliefs” are used as the traders’ beliefs.
Chapter 3
A Common Interpretation of
Equilibrium and Sequential
Markets
This chapter presents the work on interpreting the instantaneous price of sequential
markets as stochastically minimizing (via Stochastic Mirror Descent (SMD)) the same
objective as its Walrasian equilibrium, thus giving a common understanding of in-
stantaneous and equilibrium prices via an optimisation point of view [Premachandra
and Reid, 2013]. This would naturally extend the existing machine learning interpre-
tation of equilibrium markets (i.e., as producing the optimum aggregation minimis-
ing divergence-based distances of traders with different beliefs) to sequential mar-
kets. Also understanding sequential markets as SMD would enable the use of same
to achieve the optimum aggregation (which happens to be the equilibrium price) us-
ing a market approach instead of having to impose the use of convex optimisation
techniques to solve for equilibrium. This would enable the use of prediction markets
to extend machine learning models to more complex scenarios (see Storkey [2011]),
since markets can be used for solving generalised aggregation problems where each
trader is related to different types of “distances”.
Theorem 1 in Section 3.3 relates equilibrium prices to those obtained from sequential
mechanisms acting upon the same stochastic market. The mini-trading mechanism
introduced in Section 3.4 can be seen as an implementation of SMD with properties
(e.g., stability, bounded loss) that make it desirable for finding equilibrium prices.
The closest work to the contribution in this chapter is by Frongillo et al. [2012] who
first interpreted sequential markets as performing a SMD and established a connec-
tion between sequential markets and equilibrium analysis using limiting conditions
on sequential markets. The interpretation of sequential markets as SMD as given in
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Section 3.3 is a variation of their result for a more broader class of trades and a more
restrictive class of markets. The second part of the Theorem shows that the solution
of the stochastic optimisation problem is the equilibrium price of the market, thus
establishing a connection between sequential markets and equilibrium without using
limiting conditions.
Before presenting the contribution I will briefly introduce the two types of markets
we consider (Section 3.1) and present concepts related to convex analysis (Section 3.2)
which makes it possible to interpret the stochastic price update of sequential markets
via stochastic mirror descent.
3.1 Stochastic Markets
We are interested in mechanisms for aggregating trader beliefs about a single future
event with N possible outcomes (e.g., who will win an election or horse race) and
will label them 1, . . . , N. We will assume that the outcomes are mutually exclusive
and complete (i.e., exactly one of 1, . . . , N can occur). We consider prediction markets
where there are N types of contracts to be traded – one for each of the N outcomes –
that pay $1 if outcome n occurs and nothing otherwise. These markets are known as
“complete markets”.
The relationship between equilibrium and sequential markets we obtain is under
the assumption of stochastically drawn demands. The concept of drawing traders
from a distribution to analyse markets is not new. In equilibrium analysis, it analy-
ses the expected behaviour of the market as a whole. In sequential market analysis,
traders are usually drawn i.i.d. to determine the order or trading. For e.g., Manski
[2004] and Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2006]’s equilibrium market analysis and Frongillo
et al. [2012][Theorem 1]’s sequential market analysis consider traders (who make de-
mands dependant on their beliefs and wealth) drawn from a joint distribution over
beliefs and wealths.
Storkey [2011] considers traders who make demands based on their utility function,
so two traders with the same beliefs and wealth may not act similarly even when
given the same market prices. We adopt this type of market, in the sense that a
trader’s demand (as defined in Section 2.1.4) is also dependant on the trader model,
thus allowing for markets with “inhomogeneous” traders as in Storkey [2011] and
Storkey et al. [2012]. So we model markets as a distribution of demands (instead of
as a distribution of beliefs and wealths).
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There are two broad classes of market mechanisms considered:
1. Equilibrium markets (introduced in Section 2.2)
2. Sequential cost function based markets (introduced in Section 2.3.3)
Since demand operators (introduced in Section 2.1.4) are a general way of describing
trader behaviour, we model a market for both scenarios as a set M ⊂ D of demand
operators. We further assume that the demand operators for a market are drawn
i.i.d. from some distribution σ over D and refer to the distribution σ as a stochastic
market.
A stochastic analysis of markets provide much greater power than a fixed point
model associated with an equilibrium analysis. Focusing on the expected quantities
of a stochastic setting helps in relating to fixed point equilibria. However when it
comes to uniqueness and convergence, the stochastic setting is much more powerful
(i.e., conditions for the uniqueness of distributional equilibria for stochastic systems
are much cleaner and easier to establish than for fixed point analyses).
Next I will present the formal definition of market equilibrium and formalise the
price update mechanism in sequential markets under stochastically drawn demands.
3.1.1 Equilibrium Market Mechanisms
Classically, the (Walrasian) equilibrium price for a market is a fixed price at which there
is no excess demand for any good [Varian, 2009; Vazirani, 2007]. Similar to Storkey
[2011]; Storkey et al. [2012], we consider a market with more than two types of con-
tracts and assume that traders come to the market with only a cash amount (and
no previously purchased contracts). We define the equilibrium price for a stochastic
market σ to be the price pi∗σ ∈ ∆N such that the expected demand of the market in
response to the fixed-price pricing function Πpi
∗
σ is equal to the total spendings of the
traders. Formally, the equilibrium price satisfies
Ed∼σ
[
d
(
Πpi
∗
σ
)]
= Ed∼σ
[
Πpi
∗
σ
(
d
(
Πpi
∗
σ
))]
.1 (3.1)
Or using the shorthand notation for fixed-price demands
Ed∼σ
[
d
(
Πpi
∗
σ
)]
= Ed∼σ [〈pi∗σ, d(pi∗σ)〉] .1 (3.2)
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This is similar to the definition used by Storkey et al. [2012] where the expected de-
mand for any outcome equals the total wealth of the traders, assuming without loss
of generality that traders spend their entire wealth for trading. If instead traders
spend $0, then we get Frongillo et al. [2012]’s definition that the expected demand
equals zero. This also corresponds with the budget conservation principle used by Lay
and Barbu [2010, 2011].
Also if the expected demand for all outcomes equal any D ∈ R such thatEd∼σ [d (pi∗σ)] =
D.1, then we have that the total spendings also equal D (Equation 3.3), thus satisfying
the equilibrium condition.
Ed∼σ [〈pi∗σ, d(pi∗σ)〉] = 〈pi∗σ,Ed∼σ [d(pi∗σ)]〉 = D (3.3)
Equilibrium prices for a non-stochastic market with K traders with demands d1, . . . , dK
can be obtained via a distribution that puts mass 1/K over those K demands. The
question of the existence of equilibrium prices is complex but resolved [Arrow and
Debreu, 1954].
Normally the equilibrium is defined for MEU traders who maximise a concave func-
tion U(x) : RN → R, so that the equilibrium condition returns an equilibrium price
that also satisfies all the traders (since traders calculate their demands to maximise
their expected utilities). Arrow and Debreu [1954] gives an existance proof for equi-
librium for MEU traders under convexity assumptions (which holds when the in-
dividual utilities are concave). Uniqueness of equilibrium is only satisfied under
gross substitutability (or other additional conditions). This is indeed satisifed for a
market of individual securities, but may not be satisfied more generally 1. Also Lay
and Barbu [2010, 2011] gives mild conditions on the demands functions (namely that
the demand for outcome n is continuous and strictly decreasing in pin) for a unique
equilibrium. In this chapter and rest of the thesis, we don’t necessarily assume MEU
traders and a unique equilibrium.
In our Theorem 1, we assume that traders make demands to optimise some value (not
necessarily the expected utility), and use the assumption that demands are potential-
based (see Section 3.3.2). This yields a form equivalent to the above definition of
market equilibrium (Equation 3.2), thus being able to define the equilibrium market
as minimising an objective that is related to the potential-based representation of
1See our Lemma 2 which shows that MEU traders return a unique demand for a given fixed price
point.
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demands.
3.1.2 Sequential Market Mechanisms
This work is based on Sequential cost function based markets introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.3. Assume that the initial market position is x0 ∈ RN and initial instanta-
neous prices are given by ∇C(x0). Our market dynamics are the following.
At step t = 1 . . . T;
1. a demand operator dt is selected i.i.d from the stochastic market (dt ∼ σ) that
offers a pricing function Πt
2. the market position is updated to xt = xt−1 + st, (given st = dt(Πt))
3. and instantaneous prices are updated to pit = ∇C(xt) = ∇C(xt−1 + dt(Πt)) =
∇C(xt−1 + st)
So if σ is a stochastic market, traders drawn from σ with demand operators d1, . . . , dT
interact with a pricing mechanism Πt, generates sequences of positions xt = x0 +
∑ti=1 s
i, prices pit = ∇C(xt) and bundles st = dt(Πt) for t = 1, . . . , T.
Normally (i.e., in cost function-based pricing), Πt(st) = ΠC,x
t−1
(st) := C(xt−1 + st)−
C(xt−1) . In our Theorem 1, we show that this price update step corresponds with
the update step of a Stochastic Mirror Descent given in the next section.
3.2 Stochastic Mirror Descent
Our work on relating the two markets is based on interpreting the stochastic price up-
date mechanism of sequential cost function based markets as performing a stochastic
mirror descent (SMD) and showing that the direct solution to this optimisation prob-
lem is the Walrasian equilibrium of the market. Before stating the theorem, we first
recall the form of stochastic mirror descent algorithms.
3.2.1 Convex functions and its conjugate dual
The interpretation of sequential markets as SMD is based on convex cost function
based markets with a duality based representation (as given by Abernethy et al.
[2011]). These cost functions have a convenient form which allows the sequential
price updates to relate to the (duality based representation of) update mechanism of
SMD. So we first recall the convex conjugate of a function and some of its important
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properties.
For X ⊆ RN and functions f : X → R, the convex conjugate of f will be denoted
f ∗(y) := supx∈X{〈x, y〉 − f (x)}. If f is convex and closed, then f ∗∗ = f and the
conjugate of a differentiable function f is also called the Legendre transform or Fenchel
conjugate of f . If f is also differentiable on the interior of X then its derivative at
x ∈ RN will be written ∇ f (x) :=
(
∂ f (x)
∂x1
, . . . , ∂ f (x)∂xN
)
, and if f ∗(y) : RN → R then
(∇ f )−1 = ∇ f ∗ [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004]. For example, consider the gen-
eralised cost functions given by Abernethy et al. [2011], where R = C∗ and the
instantaneous prices are not restricted to be in the N-simplex.
C(x) = sup
pi∈RN
{〈pi, x〉 − R(pi)}.
If f ∗(y) : RN → R as in cost functions given by Equation (2.2), we get that if ∇ f (x) =
y, then ∇ f ∗(y) = (∇ f )−1(y) = x + k.1 for any k ∈ R.
3.2.2 Stochastic Optimisation and Stochastic Mirror Descent (SMD)
In stochastic optimisation problems there is some convex objective Φ : X → R to be
minimised that is only accessible through unbiased samples of its value and gradient.
That is, Φ(x) = Eω∼µ [Fω(x)] for some collection of convex functions Fω : X → R
for which we can compute the gradients ∇Fω(x) and distribution µ.
One very successful method for solving a problem of this type is stochastic mirror
descent [Nemirovski et al., 2009]. This algorithm starts with some initial point x0 ∈ X
as a candidate solution and iteratively improves it using samples of the objective
function, generating an update sequence x1, . . . xT. For convergence results of SMD
see Duchi et al. [2010].
Given a learning rate η ∈ (0, 1] and a strictly convex regulariser R : X → R, the
update step is
xt+1 = arg min
x∈X
{η〈x,∇Fω(xt)〉+ DR(x; xt)} = ∇R∗(∇R(xt)− η.∇Fω(xt)) (3.4)
where, at each step, ω are drawn i.i.d. from µ. The first form of the update involving
the arg min has an intuitive interpretation as a trade off between taking a step in the
steepest descent direction and staying close to the previous solution, as measured
by the Bregman distance DR(p; q) = R(p)− R(q)− 〈∇R(q), (p− q)〉 generated by R.
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The other form of the update step is derived using convex duality and is the one we
show is equivalent to sequential price updates in Theorem 1.
3.3 Sequential Prices Approximate Equilibrium Prices
First we introduce a pricing mechanism for our sequential market, our potential-
based assumption on traders’ demands and a property of cost function-based mar-
kets called liquidity insensitivity which makes it possible to interpret the stochastic
price update as a stochastic mirror descent.
3.3.1 Hybrid pricing mechanism
For the purposes of our Theorem 1 and the mini-trading mechanism in Section 3.4 we
now introduce a pricing mechanism that is somewhere in between the cost function-
based and fixed-price mechanisms (introduced in Section 2.1.3.1) which we call a
hybrid pricing mechanism and denote by Π∇C,x0 . This pricing mechanism was first
used in Frongillo et al. [2012].
Like the cost function-based mechanisms, this pricing mechanism sets prices based
on a cost function C and position x that is initialised to x0. Unlike the cost function-
based mechanism (Equation 2.1), the bundle prices are set by a fixed-price function
Π∇C(x). That is,
Π∇C,x
0
(s|s1, . . . , st) := 〈∇C(xt), s〉, where xt = x0 +
t
∑
i=1
si. (3.5)
We call this a hybrid mechanism since;
• it prices bundles using fixed prices derived from a cost function :
Π∇C,x0(s|s1, . . . , st) = 〈∇C(xt), s〉) = Π∇C(xt)(s),
• but updates the price like the cost function-based mechanism :
pit+1 = ∇C(xt+1), where xt+1 = xt + s.
The hybrid pricing function is introduced mainly because equilibrium analysis is
usually done in a fixed-price setting. Since our result is based on stochastically
drawn demands for both markets we want the demand operators for both markets
to be given the same type of pricing function, hence the use of hybrid pricing for our
sequential mechanism.
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3.3.2 Potential-based demands
In order to relate the sequential price update mechanism to a stochastic mirror de-
scent algorithm, we assume that the demand operators d are linearly related to the
negative of the gradient of some convex function. To this end, we say a trader is
potential-based if there exist functions F : ∆N → R and f : ∆N → R such that the
trader’s demand operator d satisfies
d(Πpi) = d(pi) = −∇F(pi) + f (pi).1 (3.6)
for any fixed-price pricing function Πpi. We will say a stochastic market M is
potential-based if every trader that can be drawn from DM is potential-based.
As examples for this assumption, consider the MEU demands of some popular util-
ity functions presented in Table 3.1, where DKL(p; q) = ∑n pn. ln(pn/qn) is the KL
divergence and DPβ (p; q) =
∑n qn.(pn/qn)
β−1
β(β−1) for β > 0 are the power divergences [Jose
et al., 2008]. Refer Section 4.1 for more detailed observations.
We note that the set of demand operators that are potential-based in our sense is
strictly larger than those considered by Frongillo et al. [2012]. In particular, the ex-
ponential negative decay utilities are not in the class they consider.
Even though this is a technical assumption that makes it possible to relate sequen-
tial price updates with SMD updates, we show in Chapter 4 that this relates to two
popular trader models : the MEU and risk-based traders. Particularly in the case
of risk-based traders, this form of demand function also relates to minimising a risk
function, while the potential-based representation relates to its conjugate function.
While not included in our analysis in Chapter 4, we note that Lay and Barbu [2010]
also hint that their Betting function based traders also make demands related to “po-
tential functions”, though it remains to be analysed whether and how it corresponds
with our definition of potential-based demands.
3.3.3 Liquidity Insensitivity and Translation Invariance of Cost Functions
The other property of cost functions that we use in our Theorem 1 is the property of
liquidity insensitivity. This property follows from the (positive) translation invariance
of cost functions, which states that for all positions x ∈ RN and α ∈ R the cost func-
tion C satisfies C(x + α.1) = C(x) + α. An immediate and important consequence
of this property is that the prices given by the C are invariant to purchases of equal
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Utility MEU Demand Potential-based Representation
Log Utility: u(w) = ln(w) dn(Πpi) = W
pn
pin
Fd(pi) = W.DKL(p;pi), f d(pi) = 0
Exp. Neg. Utility (r > 0):
u(w) = − exp(−r.w)
dn(Πpi) = 1r ln(pn/pin) +
W + 1r .DKL(pi; p)
Fd(pi) = 1r DKL(pi; p), f
d(pi) = W +
1
r +
1
r DKL(pi; p)
Iso-elastic Utility (β > 0):
u(w) = 1β−1
(
w
β−1
β − 1
) dn(Πpi) = WZ (pn/pin)β
for Z = ∑n pin. (pn/pin)
β
Fd(pi) = WZ β.D
P
β (p;pi), f
d(pi) = 0
Table 3.1: Potential-based MEU demands for beliefs p ∈ ∆N , wealth W and prices
pi ∈ ∆N
quantities of all contracts. That is, ∇C(x + α.1) = ∇C(x) for all x ∈ RN and α ∈ R.
This property has been studied in the context of prediction markets by Othman et al.
[2010] and recently given an axiomatic characterisation by Li and Vaughan [2013].
Chen and Vaughan [2010] show that translation invariance in cost functions follows
from requiring that the instantaneous prices defined by the cost function lies in the
probability simplex (i.e., an arbitrage-free market) and vice versa.
In the generalised cost functions as in Abernethy et al. [2011] and Abernethy et al.
[2013], the property of no-arbitrage has a generalised meaning since they consider
scenarios where prices are not restricted to be in the probability simplex. However,
since we use Arrow-Debreu securities and require prices to be in the probability sim-
plex, the cost function is defined by using a dual function for which the domain is the
probability simplex (C(x) = suppi∈∆N{〈pi, x〉 − R(pi)}). See Reid et al. [2014][Lemma
1] for derivation of translation invariance using entropic functions as in R(pi) . Also
this is a property of convex risk measures [Föllmer and Schied, 2002, 2004] further
discussed in Section 4.2.
Also note that fixed-price pricing functions (Πpi) satisfy the property of translation
invariance when pi ∈ ∆N . That is Πpi(x + α.1) = Πpi(x) + α, since 〈pi, (x + α.1)〉 =
〈pi, x〉+ 〈pi, α.1〉 = 〈pi, x〉+ α (the last equality is due to 〈pi, 1〉 = 1).
3.3.4 Main result
We now give our main result. This result shows that under the assumption of
potential-based demands and liquidity insensitive cost functions, the sequential prices
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generated by a hybrid pricing mechanism are approximating the solution of a stochas-
tic minimisation problem defined by the traders’ demands. Furthermore, the solution
of the problem is necessarily the equilibrium price for the stochastic market generat-
ing the demand operators.
Theorem 1. Suppose σ is a stochastic market of potential-based demands. Traders drawn
from σ with demand operators d1, . . . , dT interact with a hybrid sequential pricing mechanism
Π∇C,x0 generating sequences of positions xt = x0 + ∑ti=1 si, prices pit = ∇C(xt), and
bundles st = dt(pit−1) for t = 1, . . . , T. Then,
1. The generated price sequence pi1, . . . ,piT is exactly the update sequence for a stochastic
mirror descent of the function Φ(pi) := Ed∼σ
[
Fd(pi)
]
using regulariser R = C∗.
2. Any price pi∗ minimising Φ(pi) is an equilibrium price for the stochastic market σ.
Proof. Since each d drawn from σ is potential-based by assumption, there exists con-
vex functions Fd and functions f d such that d(pi) = −∇Fd(pi) + f d(pi).1. Therefore,
pit+1 = ∇C(xt+1) = ∇C(xt + st+1)
= ∇C(xt + dt+1(pit))
= ∇C(xt −∇Fdt+1(pit) + f dt+1(pit).1)
= ∇C(xt −∇Fdt+1(pit)).
The fourth equality is due to the liquidity insensitivity of C. As C is differentiable
and convex its dual R∗ is also, and their derivatives satisfy∇C = ∇R∗ and (∇C)−1 =
∇R. Since C defines prices in the N-simplex, we have that (∇C)−1(pit) = ∇R(pit) =
xt + k.1 (see Section 3.2.1). Thus,
pit+1 = ∇R∗(xt −∇Fdt+1(pit))
= ∇R∗(∇R(pit)− k.1−∇Fdt+1(pit))
= ∇R∗(∇R(pit)−∇Fdt+1(pit)).
which is precisely the stochastic mirror descent update (Equation 3.4) with regu-
lariser R, objective Φ(pi) = Ed∼σ
[
Fd(pi)
]
and step size η = 1, establishing the first
part of the theorem (the last equality is again due to the liquidity insensitivity of C).
For the second part of the theorem, consider the direct solution to the optimisa-
tion problem: minpi Φ(pi) = Ed∼σ[Fd(pi)] subject to pi ∈ ∆N . The Lagrangian for
this problem is L = Ed∼σ
[
Fd(pi)
]
+ λ(∑Nn=1 pin − 1). The KKT conditions require a
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solution pi∗ to satisfy ∇L(pi∗) = 0. Because demands are potential-based, we have
that ∇Fd(pi∗) = −d(pi∗) + f d(pi∗).1 and so
Ed∼σ
[
−d(pi∗) + f d(pi∗).1
]
+ λ.1 = 0
and therefore Ed∼σ [d(pi∗)] = (λ+Ed∼σ
[
f d(pi∗)
]
).1.
This final expression is precisely the condition for the Walrasian equilibrium (which
corresponds with Equation 3.2 due to 3.3) since the total demands for each contract
are equal. Thus the solution of the stochastic optimisation problem is an equilibrium
price for the market.
For example, consider a market with log utility maximising traders and it’s
potential-based representation (refer Table 3.1 in Section 3.3.2). Then the objective of
the stochastic market becomes the expectation of the wealth weighted KL divergences
(Ed∼σ
[
Wd.DKL(pd;pi)
]
) [Frongillo et al., 2012][Corollary 2]. Suppose the sequential
market uses the LMSR cost function C(x) = b. log(∑Nn=1 exp(xn/b). Then we have
that C∗ = R(pi) = b.∑Nn=1 pin log(pin). This gives that the generated price sequence
is exactly the update sequence for a stochastic mirror descent of the expectation of
wealth weighted KL divergences using an entropic regulariser. Also see Chen and
Vaughan [2010] who showed connections of LMSR (with respect to price updates
and worst case loss analysis) with the weighted majority algorithm.
The insight gained by the above theorem helps us to provide a meaning of the ob-
jective being minimised in such markets. We defer this discussion to Section 4.3. For
now, we will say that; for MEU traders, it can be viewed as (maximising) the sum of
(scaled) expected utilities (even though utility units may not be comparable between
traders), and for risk measure based traders, it is the sum of the risks (which are in
the same unit as currency).
The correspondence between sequential hybrid pricing and stochastic mirror descent
established by the above theorem is not perfect since the price update mechanism
has a learning rate parameter η fixed to 1. In the next section, we introduce a market
mechanism designed to incorporate a learning rate parameter in a stochastic price
update, thus implementing a stochastic mirror descent model with a built-in learn-
ing rate parameter. For small values of the learning rate parameter, we show that the
hybrid pricing mechanism closely approximates the traditional cost function-based
mechanism.
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3.4 Markets, Learning Rates and Mini-trading
One difficulty with interpreting the instantaneous prices of a sequential market
maker is the high variability of prices that can occur when the market maker has
low liquidity relative to the wealth of the traders in the market.
In Premachandra and Reid [2013], we proposed a simple idea to combat this problem
and thereby help to make prediction prices more interpretable. Instead of allowing
traders to purchase large bundles of contracts, constrained only by their wealth, we
modify the market maker’s pricing function in a way that effectively limits how
much a single trade can move the market price. Given a parameter m ∈ (0, 1], we
do so by simultaneously scaling down each bundle purchased by m, scaling up the
cost of purchasing it by 1m , and allowing traders to trade a factor of
1
m more times.
That is, we allow repeated but small-scale trader interactions as opposed to single
but large-scale interactions. We first introduce this mini-trading scheme for general
pricing functions and then focus our attention on cost function-based and hybrid
pricing mechanisms. We show that this approach does in fact improve price stability
and relate its worst-case loss to the loss of the original pricing function in the case of
cost function-based markets.
Formally, given a pricing mechanism Π, its mini-trading version for m ∈ (0, 1] is
the function
Πm(s|s1, . . . , sT) = 1mΠ(ms|ms
1, . . . , msT). (3.7)
In the case of mechanisms Πpi that use a fixed price pi to define the bundle cost 〈pi, s〉
we see immediately that the mini-trade transformation does not affect the cost since
1
m 〈pi, ms〉 = 〈pi, s〉 for all s,pi and m.
In particular, suppose Π = Π∇C,0 is a hybrid mechanism with initial position 0.
The mini-trade transformed version Πm will assign the same prices for bundles as Π
when the two mechanisms are at the same position x. However, it is important to
note that the positions of the two mechanisms after t steps will be xt = ∑ni=1 s
i for
the original mechanism and mxt for the mini-trade version. That is, the position is
also scaled by m.
To relate mini-trading to the optimisation perspective developed in the previous sec-
tion, we now consider the price update mechanism for a mini-trade transformed hy-
brid mechanism. Letting xt = ∑ti=1 s
i, the price at step t+ 1 is pit+1 = ∇C(m.xt+1) =
§3.4 Markets, Learning Rates and Mini-trading 45
∇C(m.xt + m.st).
However, since pit = ∇C(m.xt) we have that m.xt = (∇C)−1(pit) = ∇R(pit). By
following the rest of the argument in the proof of Theorem 1 we get
pit+1 = ∇R∗(∇R(pit)−m.∇Fdt+1(pit))
which is precisely the stochastic mirror descent update with η = m and regulariser
R = C∗.
Now consider the liquidity adjusted cost functions Cb(s) := b.C(s/b) considered in
Frongillo et al. [2012]. Under this transformation, the price under Cb is same as the
price under C at s/b (i.e., ∇Cb(s) = ∇C(s/b)). Now let’s consider the price at step
t + 1 Using Cb instead of the mini-trade transformed version. pit+1 = ∇Cb(xt+1) =
∇C(xt+1/b) = ∇C(xt/b + st/b). If we let b = 1/m, we get the same price update
as in mini-trading. So we see that mini-trading has the same effect as a liquidity
adjustment in terms of instantaneous prices. Also see Abernethy et al. [2014] where
a similar liquidity adjustment is used in the case of cost functions, and a risk aversion
adjustment in the case of exponential utility. However, note that in mini-trading, we
scale down a trader’s actual demand, so that the trader is allowed to trade multiple
times, thus providing the environment to sample demand functions to approximate
stochastic behaviour.
We now discuss some more properties and advantages of mini-trading. After in-
troducing an appropriate definition of price stability, we show that the price stability
in a mini-trade mechanism is better than in the original mechanisms.
3.4.1 Price Stability
Given two pricing mechanisms Π and Π′, we will say that Π′ has better price stability
than Π if, whenever the mechanisms are at positions that offer the same price, the
effect of updating the mechanism will change the price less for Π′ than for Π.
Formally, let S = (s1, . . . , st) and R = (r1, . . . , rt
′
) be trade histories and s, r ∈ RN
be bundles such that Π(s|S) = Π′(r|R). Then Π′ has better price stability than Π if
|Π(s|S, s)−Π(s|S)| > ∣∣Π′(r|R, r)−Π′(r|R)∣∣ . (3.8)
§3.4 Markets, Learning Rates and Mini-trading 46
The following theorem shows that mini-trade transformations of hybrid pricing mech-
anisms always improve price stability.
Theorem 2. Let Π∇C,0 be a hybrid pricing mechanism with initial price 0. Then mini-
trade transformed version Π∇C,0m with parameter has better price stability than Π∇C,x
0
for all
m ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. For simplicity we will let Π := Π∇C,x0 and Πm := Π∇C,x
0
m . First observe that
to meet the pre-condition for price stability – i.e., , the two mechanisms to return
identical costs for the same bundle – we need to find histories S = (s1, . . . , st) and
R = (r1, . . . , rt
′
) and bundles s and r such that
Π(s|S) = Πm(r|R) ⇐⇒ 〈∇C(xS), s〉 = m−1〈∇C(m.xR), m.r〉
where xS = ∑ti=1 s
i and xR = ∑t
′
i=1 r
i. This is clearly satisfied by R = m−1.S and r = s
for any S and s. In this case, the pricing function presented by both mechanisms will
be 〈pi, ·〉 where pi = ∇C(xS) = ∇C(m.xR).
Due to the convexity of C we know that∇C is monotonic – i.e., , 〈∇C(x)−∇C(y), x−
y〉 ≥ 0 for all x, y. Therefore,
〈∇C(xS + s)−∇C(xS), s〉 ≥ 0 and 〈∇C(xS + m.s)−∇C(xS), m.s〉 ≥ 0 (3.9)
and thus, Πm(r|R, r)−Πm(r|R) ≥ 0 and Π(s|S, s)−Π(s|S) ≥ 0 which means we can
remove the absolute value signs in the definition of price stability in (3.8).
Now consider
(Π(s|S, s)−Π(s|S))− (Πm(r|R, r)−Πm(r|R))
=(〈∇C(xS + s)−∇C(xS), s〉)− (〈m−1∇C(m.xR + m.r)−m−1∇C(m.xR), m.r〉)
=〈∇C(xS + s)−∇C(xS + m.r), s〉
=(1−m)−1〈∇C(xS + s)−∇C(xS + m.r), (1−m)s〉 ≥ 0
where the last inequality is once again due to the convexity of C and the last equality
is because ∇C(m.xR) = ∇C(xS). Since the quantities in the difference in top of that
chain are both positive by (3.9), we have established the result.
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3.4.2 Worst-case Loss
So far our analysis has been based on price updates in sequential markets. Now we
turn to the profit/loss analysis in these markets. Typically, we assume that traders
make demands so as to maximise their expected profit or utility. So traders have an
incentive to participate in the market. But the automated market-maker who has the
objective of eliciting and aggregating traders’ beliefs, may end up bearing a loss in
the market and this has been viewed as a “price” that a market-maker has to pay in
return for “learning” from the traders’ beliefs. But when designing such a market, it
is desirable to be able to set a maximum price that a market-maker is allowed to lose
in return for “learning”.
In sequential markets with cost function-based pricing, the worst-case loss of the
market-maker is defined as,
max
n∈1,...,N
(xTn − x0n)− ΣTt=1C(xt)− C(xt−1)
For strictly convex cost functions, this worst case loss has been shown to be upper
bounded [Hanson, 2007; Chen and Pennock, 2007]. For example, the LMSR cost func-
tion has worst-case loss bounded by b. ln(N) if the market-maker set initial prices pi0
as a uniform distribution. Note that the bound increases when increasing liquidity
b.
But in a market with hybrid pricing, the worst-case loss of the market-maker would
be,
max
n∈1,...,N
(yTn − y0n)− ΣTt=1〈∇C(yt−1), (yt − yt−1)〉
(denoting the contract position by y since traders may react differently). Also by con-
vexity of the cost function, we have that C(x+ s)−C(x) ≥ 〈∇C(x), s〉, which implies
that the sale of a bundle s using hybrid pricing (with prices fixed at ∇C(x)) yields
less income to the market-maker than selling the same bundle using cost function-
based pricing. Thus we have,
∀n, (yTn − y0n)− ΣTt=1C(yt)− C(yt−1) ≤ (yTn − y0n)− ΣTt=1〈∇C(yt−1), (yt − yt−1)〉
which suggests that the worst-case loss of a hybrid pricing mechanism is higher than
the worst-case loss of a cost function-based pricing mechanism.
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Due to the definition of the cost function-based pricing, for infinitesimal demands
we also have lims→0 C(x + s) − C(x) = 〈∇C(x), s〉. This means for each demand
st = yt − yt−1, for the limit st → 0, the worst-case loss analysis for a market with
hybrid pricing is the same as in a market with cost function-based pricing.
∀n, lim
st→0
(yTn − y0n)− ΣTt=1〈∇C(yt−1), (yt − yt−1)〉 ≈ (yTn − y0n)− ΣTt=1C(yt)− C(yt−1)
(3.10)
In a mini-trade transformed hybrid mechanism, since the mechanism scales down
the original demand s to m.s, we have that limm→0 m.s → 0. Intuitively, this means
that the hybrid (pricing) mechanism acts as the original cost-function based (pric-
ing) mechanism for the limit m → 0. So we conclude that a mini-trade transformed
hybrid mechanism has worst-case loss similar to a cost function-based pricing mech-
anism for the limit m→ 0.
Refer Section 4.3 for a more detailed discussion which bounds the regret of mini-
trade markets with respect to the parameter m. It may also be possible to bound this
as a function of the maximal trade quantities or some other quantities which bound
the loss associated with the part of the hybrid mechanism that is not a usual cost
function market maker. This is left as future work.
3.4.3 Experimental results
Although the contribution in this chapter is primarily a theoretical one, we briefly
present a simple experiment that demonstrates the convergence and price stability
properties of mini-trading. For this purpose we use log utility based traders d with
wealths Wd and beliefs pd who make MEU demands for fixed prices as shown in
Table 3.1. These traders participate, 1) in an original market with the LMSR cost
function with b = 1 and a hybrid pricing scheme, 2) in a mini-trade transformed
market. We set initial prices as a uniform distribution by setting initial positions
to be 0. Using equilibrium analysis as in Theorem 1 we have that the equilibrium
price Ed∼DWd.pd (i.e., , the wealth-weighted mean of the traders’ beliefs) minimises
f (pi) = Ed∼DWd.DKL(pd;pi) (or see Section 2.2.1).
For the experiment we use a binary outcome market and 100 traders who partici-
pate once each in the original market and 1/m times in the mini-trade market. For
the mini-trade market, we set m = 0.1. Traders’ beliefs pd are drawn from a normal
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distribution with mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.2. All traders have unit wealth
Wd = 1 so the equilibrium price is simply the mean belief.
The instantaneous prices of the markets, averaged over 30 simulations for the same
traders is given in Figure 3.1. For each simulation, the trading order is determined
by a random permutation order. From the price history, we see a better convergence
of instantaneous prices to the mean belief (equilibrium price) in mini-trades. Since
the price fluctuation is less in the mini-trade market, we also see that mini-trading
creates more stable prices.
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Figure 3.1: The price history of full-trade and mini-trade markets, averaged over 30
simulations. The dashed line marks the equilibrium price and bars show standard
deviation.
For completeness and as motivation for Chapter 5, we include the profit differences
of the traders for the same experiment in the case of both outcomes (Figure 3.2).
The profit difference (averaged over the 30 simulations) has been calculated as the
difference between the equilibrium profits and sequential market profits for the 100
traders who started off with unit wealth (Wd = 1). This shows that in this experi-
ment the profit difference decreases on a scale of 10000 : 1 for mini-trade parameter
m = 0.1, thus resulting in better approximations to equilibrium profits at individual
trader level.
In Chapter 5, however we are only able to obtain bounds of the total profit difference
between mini-trade and equilibrium markets.
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Figure 3.2: The profit differences of traders in full-trade and mini-trade markets,
averaged over 30 simulations. Bars show standard deviation.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we connect the instantaneous price updates in sequential markets
and the equilibrium price in equilibrium markets as solving the same optimisation
problem. We explore the convergence of instantaneous prices in sequential markets
to the equilibrium price via mini-trading, which has desirable properties of price
stability and bounded loss for the market-maker, thus mini-trading can be used as a
framework to produce aggregations that are closer to the equilibrium price using the
sequential market approach.
As a result of convergence, we suspect that mini-trading also generates profits that
are closer to the profits obtained from an equilibrium market. This is desirable be-
cause Beygelzimer et al. [2012] and Storkey et al. [2012] interpret equilibrium wealth
updates as Bayesian weight updates in an online learning setup. We present prelim-
inary results of this in Chapter 5.
We have assumed that traders don’t adopt strategic behaviour [Chen et al., 2007;
Dimitrov and Sami, 2008; Chen et al., 2009] (i.e., non-myopic trading) given the
opportunity for repeated trades in mini-trading, since each trade only results in a
“small-scale" impact on the market prices and trades occur in a randomised order.
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Proving this is left as future work.
Next chapter discusses the potential-based assumption needed for the result in this
chapter and how it relates to two existing trader models.
Chapter 4
Potential Based Demands
This chapter studies the assumption made in the previous chapter that the traders
make potential-based demands for two popular trader models. This assumption
was necessary to prove the relationship between sequential and equilibrium markets.
This chapter provides the following major contributions:
• Showing that the Maximum Expected Utility trader model does not always
satisfy the conditions needed for the SMD interpretation. But the analysis pro-
vides a sufficient condition in which this is satisfied.
• Showing that the risk-measure based trader model satisfies the conditions needed
for the SMD interpretation.
• Showing that the “regret” of mini-trading markets (with respect to equilibrium
markets) depends on the mini-trade parameter.
The interpretation of sequential pricing as SMD and the design of mini-trading mar-
kets in Chapter 3 relied on the assumption that traders make potential-based de-
mands (defined in Section 3.3.2 as (3.6)),
d(Πpi) = d(pi) = −∇F(pi) + f (pi).1
in order to interpret both stochastic markets with a hybrid sequential pricing mecha-
nism and it’s equilibrium analysis as minimising an objective Φ(pi) := Ed∼σ
[
Fd(pi)
]
.
Even though this seems like a restrictive assumption on trader behaviour, I now
consider two popular trading models (i.e., Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) traders
and convex risk-based traders) with respect to this assumption. Using both trader
models, where traders are minimising some convex function (or maximising a con-
cave function), I will show that trader demands are related to the gradient of its
(convex) conjugate function. In the case of MEU traders, it happens that not all MEU
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traders naturally satisfy this assumption (expect for log and exponential utility max-
imising agents). However I show that MEU trader demands can be expressed in the
form d(pi) = −∇w.F(pi) + f (pi).1 = −w.∇F(pi) + f (pi).1, treating w as an implicitly
defined weight (although it may be dependant on pi)1 in Section 4.1 (Collorary 1). I
obtain a much neater representation using convex risk based traders in Section 4.2
(Theorem 4).
Recall that we have defined potential based demands for fixed-price pricing (includ-
ing hybrid pricing) in order to relate to SMD updates and equilibrium analysis in
Chapter 3. In Section 4.1.3.2, I will show that cost function based pricing results in
a generalised form of potential based demands. Based on the form of cost function
based demands I obtain, it is hoped that stochastic markets with cost function based
demands can still be shown as performing an optimisation technique related to SMD.
I will leave this as future work.
Recall from Theorem 1 in Chapter 3 that the potential based assumption leads to
understanding sequential markets as minimising (via SMD) an objective similar to
machine learning aggregation problems. I will also detail how this interpretation dif-
fers from a similar understanding by Hu and Storkey [2014] with a multiple trader
interaction model that is different from mini-trading.
This chapter also relates to machine learning aggregations that minimise the sum
(or expectation) of divergence based distances. For MEU traders maximising HARA
utilities, Jose et al. [2008] have shown that the MEU is affinely related to pseudo-
spherical divergences, which in turn is monotonically related to the power diver-
gences (or α-divergences). In Section 4.1.4, I will show that MEU traders with HARA
utility make potential based demands dependent on (implicitly) weighted power di-
vergences. Similarly in Section 4.2, we note that risk based traders with HARA utility
also make potential based demands dependant on a penalty function that is mono-
tonically related to power divergences.
This naturally raises the question of designing prediction markets to directly solve
machine learning aggregations that directly minimise divergence based distances.
While the risk based traders provide a direct method of achieving this, I will point to
Agrawal et al. [2011]’s discussion (that shows that the expected utility framework is
strictly subsumed by their model that relates to convex risk measures) which seems
1Storkey et al. [2012] also used a similar implicitly defined weight to relate the equilibrium price of
iso-elastic utility traders to α-mixtures (see Section 2.2.1)
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to imply that a direct method for minimising divergence based distances may not be
achieved by utility based traders.
In Section 4.3, following the analysis of Shalev-Shwartz [2012] I will obtain regret
bounds for mini-trading with duality based potential based demands (as in MEU
and convex risk based traders), which leads to an intuition of what mini-trading
means for the traders in the market followed by a brief discussion of convergence
rates. In Section 5.1, we use this result to obtain bounds on the total traders’ wealth
updates in mini-trading with respect to equilibrium wealth updates.
4.1 MEU traders
The interpretation of sequential pricing as SMD in Section 3.3 and the design of mini-
trading markets in Section 3.4 relied on the assumption that traders make potential-
based demands (Equation 3.6). In Section 4.1.3.1 I will explore whether MEU traders
satisfy this assumption.
I will start by considering both fixed-price and cost-function based pricing func-
tions. First (in Section 4.1.1) I will introduce the MEU problem and derive the so-
lution for both pricing functions. Then (in Section 4.1.2) I define the conjugate dual
of the MEU problem, deriving a similar dual function to Jose et al. [2008], but by
using standard convex analysis. In Section 4.1.3, I show that this dual representa-
tion leads to representing MEU demands using the gradient of implicitly-weighted
MEU dual function (Theorem 3) for both pricing functions. Collorary 1 shows that
this matches with the form of potential-based demands for fixed-price pricing (3.6)
but with an implicitly-weighted function. For cost function based pricing, we get
a generalised form of potential based demands (see Section 4.1.3.2) again with an
implicitly-weighted function.
Finally in Section 4.1.4, considering the HARA class of utilities (introduced in Sec-
tion 2.1.4.1), I will add to the existing understanding of connections with power
divergences and MEU traders.
4.1.1 Preliminaries: The Maximum Expected Utility Problem
I will now expand on the introduction to MEU traders given in Section 2.1.4.1 and
will express the MEU problem in a way that can be analysed using standard convex
analysis, that makes it easier to interpret MEU demands as potential based. Also
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note that there can be various solutions giving the same expected utility value, hence
the standardisation constraint that traders spend their entire wealth so that we can
only focus on a single equivalent position. I will consider both fixed-priced and cost-
function based pricing in this section since both result in equivalent positions that
can be obtained by adding constant vector values to the solution.
Recall that a trader’s beliefs about the outcome is given by p ∈ ∆N , and W ∈ R
represents the trader’s wealth prior to trading. We assume that the trader only has a
cash amount (i.e., wealth) and no previously purchased contracts when considering
the MEU problem here, thus using the term first-time traders for such traders 2.
More formally, a utility function u : R→ R∪ {−∞} is assumed to be strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable in dom(u) := {x ∈ R : u(x) > −∞}
and to satisfy (adopting the definition given in [Goll and Rüschendorf, 2001]),
∂u(∞) = lim
x→∞ ∂u(x) = 0 and ∂u(x) = limx↓x
∂u(x) = ∞
for x := infx∈R{u(x) > −∞}. This implies either dom(u) = (x,∞) or dom(u) =
[x,∞). Or that for x ∈ dom(u), 0 ≤ ∂u(x) ≤ ∞ (with equalities applying only for the
limits). For simplicity, we write u(x) = −∞ when x /∈ dom(u).
Using the definition of u(x), for trader beliefs p ∈ ∆N , wealth W ∈ R and pricing
function Π, define an allowable bundle 3 using SW,p(Π) := {s ∈ RN : W −Π(s) + sn ∈
dom(u), ∀n ∈ [N]} that will result in a demand operator;
dMEU(Π) := arg max
s∈SW,p(Π)
En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)] .
Lemma 1. If s is an allowable bundle (i.e., s ∈ SW,p(Π)) where the pricing function Π is
translation invariant, then
1. for any α ∈ R, the bundle s+ α.1 is also an allowable bundle (i.e., s+ α.1 ∈ SW,p(Π)),
2This is to distinguish from the multi-period market model considered in Sethi and Vaughan [2013]
and Hu and Storkey [2014] where traders are allowed to make repeated trades to improve their objective
with respect to their previously purchased contracts.
3In Premachandra and Reid [2013], we used the notion of a loss avoiding bundle instead (i.e.,
SW,p(Π) := {s ∈ RN : W − Π(s) + sn ≥ V, ∀n ∈ [N]}). This condition can be obtained by let-
ting limx→V ∂u(x) = ∞ (s.t. x ≥ V). (e.g., for the HARA utility class, this condition requires that
b + β.a.(W −Π(s) + sn) ≥ 0, which becomes a loss avoiding condition for β > 0). Another common
requirement as considered in Frongillo et al. [2012] and Sethi and Vaughan [2013] is that traders will
be debt-free when the outcome is known (which can be obtained by setting V = 0 in the loss avoiding
setting).
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2. the maximum expected utility UW(p,Π) of holding s¯ and any allowable bundle of the
form s¯ + α.1 is the same. (let s¯ = arg maxs∈SW,p(Π){En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]})
UW(p,Π) = max
s∈SW,p(Π)
{En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]}
= En∼p [u(W −Π(s¯ + α.1) + (s¯ + α.1)n)]
Proof. Using the property of translation invariance (i.e., Π(s + α.1) = Π(s) + α), we
have that W −Π(s+ α.1) + (s+ α.1)n = W −Π(s)− α+ sn + α = W −Π(s) + sn. So
if W−Π(s) + sn ∈ dom(u), then also W−Π(s+ α.1) + (s+ α.1)n ∈ dom(u), proving
the first part of the lemma. The second part follows since the utility associated with
having bundle s is the same as the utility associated with having a bundle s + α.1
(i.e., u(W −Π(s) + sn) = u(W −Π(s + α.1) + (s + α.1)n), ∀n ∈ [N]).
Here I will consider both of the following pricing functions that are translation
invariant (Refer Section 3.3.3);
1. fixed-price pricing functions; Π(s) = Πpi(s) := 〈pi, s〉) and
2. cost function-based pricing functions; Π(s) = ΠC,y(s) := C(y + s)− C(y), where
y denotes the current market position.
Thus there are various equivalent positions/bundles that represent a given state of
utility. So we can express the maximum expected utility of the trader (UW(p,Π))
using any such bundle. We adopt the notation u(x) to denote the vector of utilities
given the different outcomes. i.e., u(x) := {u(x1), . . . , u(xN)}.
UW(p,Π) = max
s∈SW,p(Π)
{En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)]}
= max
s∈SW,p(Π)
{〈p, u((W −Π(s).1 + s)〉} = 〈p, u((W −Π(s¯).1 + s¯)〉
= max
x∈dom(u)
〈p, u(x)〉 = 〈p, u(x¯)〉
Due to u(x) = −∞ when x /∈ dom(u), we can drop the conditions s ∈ SW,p(Π)
and x ∈ dom(u). The second equality is due to using s¯ = arg maxs〈p, u((W −
Π(s)).1 + s)〉, the third equality by letting x ∈ RN = (W − Π(s)).1 + s and x¯ =
arg maxx 〈p, u(x)〉.
Consider a bundle x = s + α.1, when α = (W − Π(s)).1, where s ∈ SW,p(Π) and
the pricing function Π is translation invariant. Then we have that x can be inter-
preted in two ways;
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1. It is the resultant wealth of holding a bundle s (due to the definition of x).
2. Also it is the resultant wealth of holding a bundle x = (W−Π(s)).1+ s (instead
of s) and implies that Π(x) = W and vice versa.
(Consider the resultant wealth of holding a bundle x, i.e., (W −Π(x)).1 + x.
(W −Π(x)).1 + x = [W −Π((W −Π(s)).1 + s)].1 + (W −Π(s)).1 + s
= W.1− (W −Π(s)).1−Π(s).1 + (W −Π(s)).1 + s
= (W −Π(s)).1 + s = x
Now since the resultant wealth of holding a bundle x is also x (i.e., (W −
Π(x)).1 + x = x), it implies that Π(x) = W. On the other hand if Π(x) = W,
then the resultant wealth of holding x is also x.)
4.1.1.1 Solving the MEU problem with a standardization constraint
Due to the above interpretation of x, we would like to solve the MEU problem (i.e.,
the solution of dMEU(Π)) in terms of x, which can be done by requiring Π(x) = W.
This also gives us the benefit of defining UW(p,Π) in terms of the resultant wealth
update of holding the entire equivalent set of MEU demands, so that UW(p,Π) =
〈p, u(x¯)〉. So we use the Lagrangian
L(x,λ) = 〈p, u(x)〉 − λ(Π(x)−W), or
L(x,λ) = U(x)− λ(Π(x)−W), by letting U(x) : RN → R = 〈p, u(x)〉.
Note that solving the MEU problem so that it returns a single solution is not new. I
give two examples below.
1. The MEU problem in fixed-price pricing is usually solved with a self-financing
constraint (s.t. Πpi(s) ≤ W) (see Jose et al. [2008] and [Goll and Rüschendorf,
2001, Lemma 4.1]). Giving the Lagrangian L(x,λ) = 〈p, u((W − Πpi(x)).1 +
x)〉 − λ(Πpi(x)−W) = 〈p, u(x)〉 − λ(Πpi(x)−W)
2. Storkey [2011] points out the need for introducing a standardization constraint
to ensure each equivalent set of demands are represented by a single position
(that satisfies the constraint). And using the standardization constraintΠ(s) = W,
gives the same Lagrangian as above.
Next I will derive a common representation for the solution of the MEU problem for
both pricing functions under consideration.
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4.1.1.2 Solution to the MEU problem: a common representation
Lemma 2. For translation invariant pricing functions, the MEU demands dMEU(Π) = x¯
can be expressed in the form x¯ = (∇U)−1(λq) := {( ∂U∂x1 )−1(λq1), . . . , ( ∂U∂xN )−1(λqN)} for
q = ∇Π(x), where U(x) = 〈p, u(x)〉 and Π(x¯) = W.
Proof. Defining the Lagrangian (using the standardization constraintΠ(x) = W) L(x,λ) =
〈p, u(x)〉 − λ(Π(x) −W), and by letting the derivatives of the Lagrangian with re-
spect to x to be zeros, we get;∇(x)〈p, u(x)〉 = {p1. ∂u(x1)∂(x1) , . . . , pN .
∂u(xN)
∂(xN)
} = {λq1, . . . ,λq1},
where q = ∇Π(x). For vectors q and p, we denote the element wise division by
q
p := { q1p1 , . . . ,
qN
pN
}. This gives, x¯ = (∂u)−1(λ qp ) (since we consider strictly increasing,
strictly concave and continuously differentiable utility functions, the inverse map-
ping of the gradient returns a unique solution).
λ is implicitly uniquely determined by Π(x¯) = W (using the Lagrangian conditions
λ(Π(x)−W) = 0 and λ > 0).
Alternatively, defining the Lagrangian in terms of U(x) = 〈p, u(x)〉, (i.e., L(x,λ) =
U(x)− λ(Π(x)−W)) we get that ∇U(x) = λq and so x¯ = (∇U)−1(λq). Also since
∂U(x)
∂xn = pn.
∂u(xn)
∂(xn)
for n ∈ [N], we can write
x¯ = (∇U)−1(λq) = {
(
∂U
∂x1
)−1
(λq1), . . . ,
(
∂U
∂xN
)−1
(λqN)}
= {(∂u)−1 (λ q1
p1
), . . . , (∂u)−1 (λ
qN
pN
)}
For fixed-price pricing (Πpi), we get that q = pi and λ is implicitly uniquely deter-
mined by 〈pi, x¯〉 = W (see Jose et al. [2008] and [Goll and Rüschendorf, 2001, Lemma
4.1]). For cost function-based pricing ΠC,y, we get that q = ∇(x¯)(C(y + x¯)− C(y)) =
∇(y+x¯)C(y + x¯) and λ is implicitly uniquely determined by ΠC,y(x¯) = W. Note that
now q also represents the new instantaneous price in a Sequential Cost Function
based market, after a demand x¯ + α.1 (or s¯).
Note that this solution represents the MEU demands using the gradient (and in-
verse) of a concave function. Also note that the potential-based representation is
with respect to a convex function whose domain is the probability simplex (∆N) (not
RN as in the above solution). To be able to relate to potential based demands, I now
turn to the conjugate dual analysis.
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4.1.2 Conjugate dual of the MEU problem
Using the understanding of the MEU problem, we now define the convex conjugate
of it, which allows us to switch between thinking in terms of prices and thinking in
terms of demands. We see that this brings us one step closer to the potential based
representation.
Let’s define a convex function f (x) = −U(x) and consider the convex conjugate
of f (x), f ∗(y) = supx 〈x, y〉 − f (x). If xˆ = arg maxx 〈x, y〉 − f (x), we have that,
f ∗(y) = 〈xˆ, y〉 − f (xˆ) and xˆ = (∇ f )−1(y) = ∇ f ∗(y).
By re-writing the MEU problem in terms of f (x), we have4 x¯ = arg maxx{〈p, u(x)〉} =
arg maxx{U(x)} = arg minx{ f (x)}
Similarly defining a Lagrangian (with the standardization constraintΠ(x) = W) L(x,λ) =
f (x) + λ(Π(x)−W) and by letting the derivatives of this Lagrangian (with respect
to x) to be zeros, we get ∇ f (x) = −λ.∇Π(x) and x¯ = (∇ f )−1(−λ.∇Π(x)).
Now we note that the MEU demand x¯ can be expressed as the gradient of its conju-
gate dual function.
Lemma 3. For translation invariant pricing functions, and for the convex function f (x) =
−U(x) and it’s dual function f ∗(y), the MEU demands dMEU(Π) = x¯ can be expressed as
the gradient of the conjugate dual of f (x) (i.e., x¯ = ∇ f ∗(y)), where U(x) = 〈p, u(x)〉 and
Π(x¯) = W.
Proof. Now consider f ∗(y) at y = −λq, where q = ∇Π(x). Also we have x¯ =
(∇ f )−1(y) for y = −λq. So x¯ = xˆ = ∇ f ∗(y) for xˆ = arg maxx 〈x, y〉 − f (x), proving
the lemma.
Also f ∗(y) = 〈xˆ, y〉 − f (xˆ) = 〈x¯, y〉 − f (x¯) for y = −λq. This gives,
f ∗(−λq) = −λ〈x¯, q〉 − f (x¯) = UW(p,Π)− λ〈x¯, q〉
In fixed-price pricing this gives,
f ∗(−λpi) = − f (x¯)− λW = UW(p,Πpi)− λW
4I have dropped the condition x ∈ dom(u) since by definition u(x) = −∞ when x /∈ dom(u)
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since ∇(x)Πpi(x) = pi and 〈x¯,∇(x)Π(x)〉 = 〈x¯,pi〉 = W (by using the Lagrangian
conditions λ(〈pi, x〉 −W) = 0 and λ > 0). For fixed-price pricing, we shorthand
UW(p,Πpi) as UW(p,pi). The expression for f ∗(−λq) we have obtained is denoted as
a u∗λ(p||pi) divergence in Jose et al. [2008], who used a slightly similar technique by
adopting a different form of dual function as described in Appendix A. The reason
for using a different technique in this thesis is due to the convenience in being able
to use the properties of standard convex analysis for our analysis.
4.1.3 Understanding MEU demands
Lemma 3 expressed the MEU demands as the gradient of a convex function. But
still this form is not compatible with the form of potential based demands since
we require that the gradient is with respect to a point in the probability simplex.
However note that for both fixed-priced and cost-function based pricing functions,
q = ∇(x)Π(x) ∈ ∆N .
Using the fact that the solution to the MEU problem (i.e., x¯ = arg maxx 〈p, u(x)〉 =
arg maxx U(x) = arg minx f (x)) is given by x¯ = ∇(y) f ∗(y) for y = −λ.∇(x)Π(x)
(Lemma 3), I will now use a scaled version of f ∗ to express x¯ using the gradient with
respect to ∇Π(x) ∈ ∆N (Theorem 3) for both fixed-priced and cost-function based
pricing functions.
For this I require the following result (see [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004]), which is
well-known and easily established property of conjugates. Due to the slight change of
the use of variables, I re-state the scaling properties of the conjugate dual in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. For a scaled convex differentiable function g(x) = a. f (x) (where a is a scalar
value and f (x) is convex and differentiable), and its convex conjugate function g∗(h) =
supx{〈x, h〉 − g(x)}, we have that g∗(a.y) = a. f ∗(y) and ∇(a.y)g∗(a.y) = ∇ f ∗(y). 5
Proof. First consider f ∗(y) = supx 〈x, y〉 − f (x). Then by letting h = a.y, we get;
g∗(a.y) = supx 〈x, a.y〉 − g(x) = a.[supx 〈x, y〉 − f (x)] = a. f ∗(y).
Then taking the derivatives of both sides at a.y; ∇(a.y)g∗(a.y) = ∇(a.y)(a. f ∗(y)) =
∇(y)(a. f ∗(y)).∇(a.y)y = a.∇(y) f ∗(y).1/a = ∇(y) f ∗(y).
Theorem 3. Suppose traders make demands to maximise their expected utility. If s¯ =
dMEU(Π) := arg maxs∈SW,p(Π)En∼p [u(W −Π(s) + sn)] defines the trader’s demands in
5I use the subscript form in ∇ to explicitly denote where the derivative is at (e.g., ∇(x) denotes that
the derivative is at x).
§4.1 MEU traders 61
fixed-price or cost-function based pricing, then, s¯ = −∇(q)g∗(−q)) −W.1 + Π(s¯).1, (or
equivalently, x¯ = −∇(q)g∗(−q), for x¯ = W.1− cost(s¯).1 + s¯) where λ (which is implicitly
uniquely determined by Π(x¯) = W as in the proof of Lemma 2) is assumed to be a constant
(i.e., not dependant on q), g(x) = 1/λ. f (x), f (x) = −U(x) = −〈p, u(x)〉 and q =
∇Π(x).
Proof. Consider g(x) = 1/λ. f (x). Substituting a = 1/λ and y = −λq to Lemma 4,
we get; ∇(−q)g∗(−q) = ∇(−λq) f ∗(−λq) = x¯.
This gives x¯ = −∇(q)g∗(−q) where, g∗(−q) = 1λ . f ∗(−λq).
Note that the above result holds when treating 1/λ as a scalar constant, even
though in most cases λ may be implicitly dependant on ∇Π(x). For example, for
iso-elastic traders λ = (βW/Z)
1
β , where Z = ∑Nn=1 pin(pn/pin)β in fixed-priced pric-
ing. But log utility traders result in λ = 1/W. However, this provides a sufficient
condition for first-time MEU traders to be considered as potential-based (i.e. when λ
is a constant as in the case of log utilities).
It then follows (Collorary 1) that fixed-priced pricing results in potential based de-
mands, while cost-function based pricing results in a slightly different representation.
4.1.3.1 MEU demands in fixed-price trading are potential based
Next we obtain that this results in a potential based representation in case of fixed-
price pricing.
Corollary 1. In the case of fixed-priced pricing (i.e., Π = Πpi), MEU demands can be
expressed as potential based demands, when 1/λ is treated as a scalar constant.
Proof. Consider x¯ = −∇(q)g∗(−q), where q = ∇Π(x) from Theorem 3. Since Π(x) =
Πpi(x) = 〈pi, x〉, we have that q = ∇Π(x) = pi. Resulting in x¯ = −∇(pi)g∗(−pi) =
−∇(pi)
( 1
λ . f
∗(−λ.pi)).
Now consider that the trader can make any demand d(pi) = s¯ = −∇(pi)g∗(−pi) −
W.1 + 〈s¯,pi〉.1. This matches with our potential based definition in Equation 3.6
(with F(pi) = g∗(−pi) and f (pi) = 〈d(pi),pi〉 −W), when 1/λ is treated as a scalar
constant.
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We further simplify,
x¯ = −∇(pi)
(
1
λ
. f ∗(−λ.pi)
)
= −∇(pi)
(
1
λ
. (UW(p,pi)− λW)
)
= −∇(pi)
(
1
λ
.UW(p,pi)
)
= − 1
λ
.∇(pi)UW(p,pi)
The second equality is due to 〈x¯,pi〉 = W and the last since 1/λ is treated as a scalar
constant.
Also note that this interpretation is not consistent with traders with already pur-
chased contracts. In that case, the resultant positions of traders (not the demands) is
expressible as potential based similar to the above.
Lemma 5. If the trader has some contracts purchased z ∈ RN beforehand, then we have that
the fixed-price demands are not potential based, but that the resultant position can still be
expressed as potential based.
Proof.
UW(p||pi) = max
s∈SW,p(Π)
{En∼p [U(W + z− 〈pi, s〉+ s)] = 〈p, U(W + z− 〈pi, s〉+ s〉}
= 〈p, U(W + z− 〈pi, s¯〉+ s¯)〉, (for s¯ = arg max
s
〈p, U(W + z− 〈pi, s〉+ s〉)
= max
x∈domu
〈p, U(x)〉, by letting x = W + z− 〈pi, s〉+ s
= 〈p, U(x¯)〉, (for x¯ = arg max
x
〈p, U(x)〉)
We still have that the x¯ is potential based since; x¯ = −∇(pi)g∗(−pi), where x¯ =
W + z− 〈pi, s¯〉+ s¯ But the MEU demands s¯ = −∇(pi)g∗(−pi)−W + 〈pi, s¯〉 − z are not
potential based.
4.1.3.2 MEU demands in Cost function based trading
In the case of cost function-based pricing (i.e., Π = ΠC,y), we get the following rep-
resentation for MEU demands which is not exactly matching with potential based
demands.
Consider x¯ = −∇(q)g∗(−q), where q = ∇Π(x) from Theorem 3. Since Π(x) =
ΠC,y(x) = C(y + x) − C(y), we have that q = ∇Π(x) = ∇(x)(C(y + x) − C(y)) =
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∇(y+x)C(y + x). Resulting in x¯ = −∇(q)g∗(−q) = −∇(q)
( 1
λ . f
∗(−λq)).
Note that q = ∇(y+x)C(y + x) ∈ ∆N also represents the new instantaneous price
in a Sequential Cost Function based market, after a demand x¯ + α.1 (or s¯).
4.1.4 HARA utilities, scoring rules and divergences
Machine learning aggregations usually minimise the sum (or expectation) of diver-
gence based distances. Jose et al. [2008] have shown that the resultant utility of a
HARA utility trader when a particular outcome has occurred relates to scoring rules.
They further show that HARA utility based traders make demands so that their ex-
pected utility is related to wealth-weighted power divergences. See Appendix A for
a more detailed discussion of HARA utilities related to Jose et al. [2008]’s work.
Using the understanding of MEU demands as potential-based (from Section 4.1.3.1),
we get that traders with HARA utilities make potential based demands that are re-
lated to (implicitly) weighted power divergences. Applying Collorary 1 and treating
λ as a constant (or implicit weight) to the non-linear HARA utility class, we present
the simplifications to x¯ = − 1λ .∇(pi)UW(p||pi) in Table 4.1, for trader beliefs p ∈ ∆N ,
wealth W and prices pi ∈ ∆N . Treating λ as a constant means that traders perceive
λ as an unknown value which will be fixed later (once the demand calculations are
done). Storkey et al. [2012] also used a similar implicitly defined weight to relate the
equilibrium price of iso-elastic utility traders to α-mixtures (see Section 2.2.1).
Utility UW(p||pi) = 1λ = − 1λ .∇(pi)UW(p||pi) =
Log Utility: u(w) = ln(w) W.DKL(p;pi) + ln(W) W −W.∇(pi)DKL(p;pi)
Exp. Neg. Utility (r > 0):
u(w) = − exp(−r.w)
1− exp(rW + DKL(pi; p)) 1/r. exp(rW+
DKL(pi; p))
−1/r.∇(pi)DKL(pi; p)
Iso-elastic Utility (β > 0):
u(w) = 1β−1
(
w
β−1
β − 1
) 1β−1 (W β−1β Z 1β − 1), for
Z = ∑Nn=1 pin. (pn/pin)
β
(
Z
βW
)1/β −β. WZ∇(pi)DPβ (p;pi)
HARA Utility : u(w) =
1
β−1
(
(b + βaw)
β−1
β − 1
) 1β−1 ((b + βaW) β−1β Z 1β − 1) 1a ( Zb+βaW)1/β −β. (W+ baβ )Z ∇(pi)DPβ (p;pi)
Table 4.1: MEU solutions for HARA utilities and connections to divergences
This gives a potential based representation with respect to implicitly weighted power
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divergences for HARA utilities. Thus (using Theorem 1) stochastic sequential mar-
kets with HARA utility traders and equilibrium markets with HARA utility traders
can be interpreted as minimising the expectation of (implicitly) weighted power
divergences. This extends Frongillo et al. [2012]’s result that stochastic sequential
markets with log utility traders can be interpreted as minimising the expectation of
wealth-weighted KL divergences.
For iso-elastic utility traders, this also recovers the result by Storkey et al. [2012]
where the equilibrium price is an implicitly weighted entropic mean, which relates
to the minimisation of (implicitly weighted) power divergences (see Section 2.2.1). It
is also interesting to note that the demands of exponential negative decay utility also
match the potential based representation perfectly (without having to rely of implicit
weights), even though λ is still dependant on pi.
In Section 4.2.1.2, I will note that HARA utility based risk based traders have a
penalty function that is monotonically related to power divergences. Later in Sec-
tion 4.2 I will show that these traders make potential based demands related to this
penalty function.
4.2 Convex risk based traders
The above interpretation of MEU demands as potential demands (in Theorem 3 and
Collorary 1) is not very satisfactory due to the use of implicit weights. Following Hu
and Storkey [2014], we now focus on the risk measure based trader in a prediction
market, which can be described as having the properties of risk aversion (minimisa-
tion) and wealth invariance (briefly introduced in Section 2.1.4.3). Hu and Storkey
[2014] show that traders who minimise a convex risk measure in a multi-period cost
function based market minimise a type of objective that is dual to typical aggregation
problems (also similar to the form of market equilibrium discussed in Section 3.3).
By using the representation of convex risk measures obtained through Fenchel con-
jugacy, we highlight that the demands of a first-time trader in the market can be
naturally represented by the (negative of the) gradient of the dual of risk measures.
Next we show that a first-time trader in a hybrid sequential cost function based mar-
ket makes demands which matches with the potential based representation we used
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
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4.2.1 Preliminaries: Risk measures
In the MEU problem, traders make demands x to maximise U(x) = 〈p, u(x)〉, or
equivalently to minimise −U(x), which is convex, monotonic and outputs a value
that only has abstract meaning. In contrast, convex risk measures outputs a monetary
value and satisfies convexity, monotonicity and (negative) translation invariance and
has a form
ρ(x) = sup
q∈∆N
{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)}
and the corresponding dual representation
α(q) = sup
x∈RN
{〈q,−x〉 − ρ(x)}
where α(q) is a penalty function defined on probability measures. It has been shown
that risk measures satisfy [Föllmer and Schied, 2004],
• Monotonicity: If x ≤ y , then ρ(x) ≥ ρ(y) and
• Cash (translation) invariance: If m ∈ R, then ρ(x + m) = ρ(x)−m.
If a trader buys a bundle s in a prediction market, the resultant wealth vector for the
trader is given by x = W −Π(s) + s. Similar to Section 4.1, it is also the resultant
wealth vector for holding a bundle x. So ρ(x) is the risk of holding x. For now, we
assume that the trader enters the market only with a cash amount and no previously
purchased contracts, which we refer to as a first-time trader.
The risk ρ(x) is also seen as a capital (monetary) requirement, such that ρ(x) is
the amount which should be added to the position x in order to make it acceptable
(thus also called as shortfall risk). Since a monetary risk measure induces the class
A := {x ∈ dom(x)|ρ(x) ≤ 0}
of positions which are acceptable in the sense that they do not require additional
capital, the class A will be called the acceptance set of ρ and ρ can be recovered from
A :
ρ(x) = inf{m ∈ R|m + x ∈ A}
also
α(q) := sup
x∈A
〈q,−x〉.
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4.2.1.1 Utility based convex risk measures
A utility based risk measure can be derived by defining an acceptance set
A := {x ∈ dom(x)|〈p, u(x)〉 ≥ u0} = {x ∈ dom(x)|〈p, l(−x)〉 ≤ x0},
giving a risk measure of the form
ρ(x) = inf{m ∈ R|〈p, u(x + m)〉 ≥ u0} = inf{m ∈ R|〈p, l(−x−m)〉 ≤ x0},
where l(x) = −u(−x) and x0 = −uo.
In this setting the corresponding penalty function is given by,
α(q) =
1
λ
( f ∗(−λq)− u0) (4.1)
where λ is defined by, 〈p, u(I(λ qp ))〉 = u0 by letting I(y) = (∂u)−1(y). 6 The rest of
the notation is similar to the notation used in Section 4.1. The discussion up to now
is due to Föllmer and Schied [2004].
Also note that these traders maintain an objective that is similar to Constant Utility
based Market Makers briefly discussed in Section 2.3.5. While these market makers
determine prices that keep their expected utility constant (when new demands are
made in the market), utility based risk traders can be seen as determining demands
(in response to market prices) to keep their expected utility constant.
Equation (4.1) is a re-expression of the penalty function given in [Föllmer and Schied,
2004] to similar notation that we used in Section 4.1. This allows us to compare the
Proposition 2 which expresses the demands of risk-based traders using the gradi-
ent of the penalty function with our earlier Theorem 3, where we expressed the
demands of MEU traders using the gradient of a similar function (as shown by the
re-expression below), but by treating λ as a scalar constant. For completeness I now
re-derive the penalty function in our notation and also in the notation used by Jose
et al. [2008] (see Appendix A).
Proposition 1. The penalty function α(q) which relates to the utility based risk measure
ρ(x) = inf{m ∈ R|〈p, u(x + m)〉 ≥ u0} can be re-expressed as α(q) = 1λ ( f ∗(−λq)− u0)
(Equation (4.1)) or α(q) = 1λ (u
∗
λ(p||q)− u0).
6Recall that for vectors q and p, we denote the element wise division by qp := { q1p1 , . . . ,
qN
pN }.
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Proof. Consider the penalty function of a convex risk-measure.
α(q) = sup
x∈RN
{〈q,−x〉 − ρ(x)}
= sup
x+m∈RN
{〈q,−(x + m)〉 − ρ(x + m)}
= sup
x+m∈RN
〈q,−(x + m)〉
The second equality is by letting m = ρ(x) and the third is due to ρ(X + m) = 0
using the property of translation invariance.
Now define a Lagrangian to solve for the optimal x′ = x + m; L = {〈q,−x′〉 +
1
λ (〈p, u(x′)〉 − uo), since ρ(x′) = 0 implies that 〈p, u(x′)〉 = uo. This gives, ∂u(x′) =
λ
q
p or x
′ = x+m = (∂u)−1(λ qp ) = (∇U)−1(λq) using similar notation as in Lemma 2.
Since 〈p, u(x′)〉 − uo = 0 due to the Lagrangian conditions, we get that λ is defined
by, 〈p, u(I(λ qp ))〉 = u0 by letting I(y) = (∂u)−1(y).
Also, we have that f ∗(−λq) = −λ〈q, x′〉 − f (x′) = λ〈q,−x′〉 + U(x′) due to the
dual form of MEU demands. By re-arranging and using 〈p, u(x′)〉 = U(x′) = uo we
get Equation (4.1).
α(q) = 〈q,−x′〉 = 1
λ
( f ∗(−λq)− u0)
Alternatively, using u∗(y) ≡ supx∈R{u(x)− xy} = u(I(y))− yI(y) (adopting the no-
tation used by Jose et al. [2008]), we get that u∗(λ qp ) = u(x
′)−λ qp x′. Taking the expec-
tation, 〈p, u∗(λ qp )〉 = 〈p, u(x′)〉−λ.〈q, x′〉 = u0−λ.〈q, x′〉. Now since α(q) = 〈q,−x′〉,
we get that
α(q) =
1
λ
(〈p, u∗
(
λ
q
p
)
〉 − u0) = 1
λ
(u∗λ(p||q)− u0).
4.2.1.2 HARA utility based convex risk measures
To relate with the discussion in Section 4.1.4, I now show that the penalty function for
HARA utility based risk-measure based traders is monotonic to power divergences.
Applying Proposition 1 to HARA utilities, we get that α(q) = −
(
W + baβ
)
Z
−1
β−1 + baβ
for Z = ∑Nn=1 pin. (pn/pin)
β, which is a monotonic transformation of
(
W + baβ
)
βDPβ (p; q).
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In Theorem 4, I will show that in case of fixed-price pricing (Πpi,) q in α(q) equals
pi, and that the demand matches with the potential based representation (i.e., the
demand x = −∇α(pi)− µ.1) for µ defined as in Proposition 2.
4.2.2 Understanding traders’ demands based on convex risk measures
I will now focus on the definition of risk measures to show that a first-time trader’s
position x will always be related to the gradient of the corresponding penalty func-
tion. I will also show that this relationship does not hold for the demands of a
trader in a multi-period market. Later I show that the demands of a first-time trader
matches with the potential based definition when using a fixed-price pricing function.
4.2.2.1 Demands of a first-time trader
We now focus on the final position x of a first time trader. If the trader has initial
wealth W and makes a purchase s, then his final position is equivalent to holding a
position x = (W −Π(s)).1+ s. We still adopt the fixed-price pricing and cost function-
based pricing functions we used in Section 4.1, so that we have that the Π(x) = W.
Now I show that a first trader makes demands that is linearly related to the negative
of the gradient of the penalty function.
Proposition 2. If a convex risk measure based first-time trader with an initial wealth W
makes a purchase s in a market where the pricing function is translation invariant (i.e.,
Π(s + α.1) = Π(s) + α for any α ∈ R), then the demand s can be expressed as s =
−∇α(q∗)+ (Π(s)−Π(−∇α(q∗))).1 for a risk measure ρ(x) = supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉− α(q)}
and q∗ = arg supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)}.
Proof. Let the trader’s equivalent position be x = (W − Π(s)).1 + s. This gives
Π(x) = W, using the translation invariance property of the pricing functions (Sec-
tion 3.3.3).
Since ρ(x) = supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)}, we get that −x = ∇α(q∗) + µ.1, for q∗ =
arg supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)} where µ is a Lagrangian dual variable requiring that
〈q, 1〉 = 1. Letting y = −∇α(q∗), we write, x = y − µ.1. This gives that Π(x) =
Π(y)− µ = W. So µ = Π(y)−W and x = (W −Π(y)).1 + y.
Since x = (W − Π(s)).1 + s, this gives us that s = y + (Π(s) − Π(y)).1, or that
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the trader makes demands that is linearly related to the negative of the gradient of
the penalty function, proving the proposition.
Recall from Proposition 1 that penalty function is given by α(q) = 1λ ( f
∗(−λq)− u0)
in the case of utility based risk based traders. Also from Theorem 3, that the de-
mands of MEU traders relates to the negative of the gradient of g∗(−∇Π(x)) =
1
λ f
∗(−λ.∇Π(x)) when λ is treated as a scalar constant. While both the penalty
function α(q) and the dual function g∗(−∇Π(x)) have slightly similar forms, due to
Proposition 2, we have that demands in the risk-measure based model can be natu-
rally expressed as related to the negative of the gradient of the penalty function (i.e.,
without having to depend on λ being constant as in the MEU trader model).
Also since α(q∗) = supx∈RN{〈q∗,−x〉− ρ(x)}, it gives an interpretation of x in ρ(x) as
arg minx∈RN{ρ(x) + 〈q∗, x〉} for q∗ = arg supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(x)}. So the demands
of a risk-measure based trader can be seen as minimising ρ(x) + 〈q∗, x〉. In Hu and
Storkey [2014], x is interpreted as the minimiser of ρ(x), although it is not clear of the
role or interpretation of q∗ in their setting. In Theorem 4, I will show that q∗ corre-
sponds with the prices pi in fixed-price pricing, so x can be interpreted as minimising
ρ(x), given that Πpi(x) = W.
4.2.2.2 Demands of a trader in a multi-period market
Following Hu and Storkey [2014], if a trader is allowed to make subsequent trades,
we get that the above relationship (given in Proposition 2) does not hold any more.
Let Wt−1 be the traders remaining wealth (cash) and xt−1 be the total purchases so far
at the time of a tth subsequent trade. Then the trader will be holding an equivalent
position Xt = Wt−1.1 + xt−1 −Π(st).1 + st, at the end of the tth trade if he makes a
purchase st at time t.
We now get that st + xt−1 = y + (Π(xt−1 + st)−Π(y)).1 = xt, so that the trader’s
demand st does not satisfy the linear relationship with the gradient of the penalty
function any more (unless xt−1 = k.1 for any k ∈ R).
4.2.3 First-time trader in a fixed-price market makes potential-based de-
mands
Using fixed-price pricing (Π(s) = Πpi(s) := 〈pi, s〉), I now show that q∗ corresponds to
the fixed price pi, for risk-measure based traders, so that:
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1. The demands of a first-time trader in fixed-price pricing can be expressed as
potential based, thus satisfying the condition for SMD in Theorem 1.
2. x can be interpreted as arg minx∈RN{ρ(x)}, since Π(x) = 〈pi, x〉 = W.
Theorem 4. If a convex risk measure based first-time trader with an initial wealth W makes
a demand s in a market with a fixed-price pricing function (Π(s) = Πpi(s) := 〈pi, s〉), where
pi ∈ int(∆N) (i.e., ∀npin ∈ (0, 1)), then
1. q∗ = pi, where q∗ = arg supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)}, for a risk measure ρ(x) =
supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)},
2. the demand s = −∇α(pi) + (Π(s)−Π(−∇α(pi))).1, thus potential based,
3. the equivalent position x = (W −Π(s)).1 + s is the minimiser of ρ(x).
Proof. First I show that q∗ = arg supq∈∆N{〈q,−x〉 − α(q)} = pi. Let y = −∇α(q∗).
From Proposition 2 we have that x = y − µ.1 for x = (W − Π(s)).1 + s, where
Π(x) = Π(y)− µ = W. So µ = Π(y)−Π(x) = 〈pi, y〉 − 〈pi, x〉 and x = y− (〈pi, y〉 −
〈pi, x〉).1 = y− (〈pi, y〉 −W).1 (since Π(x) = W). Since ρ(x) = 〈q∗,−x〉 − α(q∗), we
can write
ρ(x) = 〈q∗,−x〉 − α(q∗)
= ρ(y− µ.1) = ρ(y) + µ
= ρ(y) + 〈pi, y〉 − 〈pi, x〉
By re-arranging we have 〈pi, x〉+ ρ(x) = 〈pi, y〉+ ρ(y). Now taking the derivative of
both sides with respect to y gives,
∇(x)(〈pi, x〉+ ρ(x)).∇(y)x = ∇(y)(〈pi, y〉+ ρ(y))
(pi − q∗).∇(y)x = (pi − q∗)
(pi − q∗).(1− pi) = (pi − q∗)
for all pi. Consider α(q∗) = supx∈RN{〈q∗,−x〉 − ρ(x)} = sup(x+k.1)∈RN{〈q∗,−(x +
k.1)〉 − ρ((x + k.1))} (where we have used the translation invariance property of risk
measures). So we have that that −q∗ = ∇ρ(x) = ∇(x+k.1)ρ(x + k.1) for any k ∈ R,
which gives the second equality. The third equality is due to x = y− (〈pi, y〉 −W)1.
This gives us that q∗ = pi for pi ∈ int(∆N), proving the first part.
For the second part of the theorem, use the result from Proposition 2 that s =
−∇α(q∗) + (Π(s) − Π(−∇α(q∗))).1. By using q∗ = pi, we get that the demand
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s = −∇α(pi) + (〈pi, (s − ∇α(pi))〉).1 satisfies our definition of potential based de-
mands given in Equation (3.6) with F(pi) = α(pi) and f (pi) = 〈pi, (s−∇α(pi))〉.
Finally, consider α(q∗) = supx∈RN{〈q∗,−x〉− ρ(x)}, giving α(pi) = supx∈RN{〈pi,−x〉−
ρ(x)} since q∗ = pi. So x in ρ(x) corresponds to arg minx∈RN{ρ(x)}, since Π(x) =
〈pi, x〉 = W
Also refer to Schied [2004], where the solution to the utility based risk minimis-
ing problem is given with respect to a fixed price, which translates to our notation as
x + ρ(x) = (∂u)−1(λpip ), so matches with our interpretation of q
∗ = pi.
Since the demands of a first-time risk measure based trader in fixed-price pricing
can be expressed as potential based, as was assumed Theorem 1 (to relate sequential
pricing with SMD), convex risk measure based traders in a stochastic market with a
hybrid sequential pricing mechanism will generate prices related to a SMD for min-
imising a function Φ(pi) := Ed∼σ
[
αd(pi)
]
using regulariser R = C∗. This is different
from Hu and Storkey [2014]’s interpretation that traders minimise an objective that
is dual to a similar function as in SMD in a multi-period market in the sense that
1. their result holds at convergence using multi-period markets, although the con-
ditions under which the market will converge is not given,
2. they do not need the hybrid pricing assumption as I have assumed and
3. the demands of a trader in a multi-period market cannot be expressed as po-
tential based even if hybrid pricing is assumed (this follows from the brief
discussion in Section 4.2.2.2)
On the other hand, the fact that demands are potential based can be used to imple-
ment a mini-trading market which gives us a parameter similar to the learning rate
in SMD to influence the convergence of the market. We next discuss convergence
properties of using mini-trading.
4.3 A regret bound for mini-trading with potential based de-
mands
We now attempt to obtain a bound of regret in mini-trading with potential based
demands, which depends on the mini-trade parameter m ∈ (0, 1]. In Section 5.1, we
use this result to obtain bounds on the total traders’ wealth updates in mini-trading
with respect to equilibrium wealth updates.
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Following Section 3.4 and the argument in the proof of Theorem 1 we get that the
prices are updated in the market according to, pit+1 = ∇R∗(∇R(pit)−m.∇Fdt+1(pit)).
We can also write this as, pit+1 = arg minpi∈∆N{〈pi,∇Fd
t+1
(pit)〉+ 1m DR(pi;pit)} (refer
Equation (3.4) in Section 3.2.2).
Then the mini-trading version corresponds to using a regulariser R′ = 1m C
∗ in SMD.
If the original R = C∗ had the property that it is σ-strongly convex with respect to
(w.r.t.) a norm ‖.‖, then we have that R′ is 1mσ-strongly convex w.r.t. the same norm
[Shalev-Shwartz, 2012]. Also let Ld
t
be the Lipschitz parameter of Fd
t
w.r.t. the same
norm. Then following Shalev-Shwartz [2012][Theorem 2.11], the regret of the market
procedure can be written (in our notation),
T−1
∑
t=0
(Fd
t+1
(pit)− Fdt+1(pi∗)) ≤
T−1
∑
t=0
〈(pit − pi∗),∇Fdt+1(pit)〉
≤ 1
m
R(pi∗)− 1
m
R(pi0) +
m
σ
T−1
∑
t=0
(Ld
t+1
)2
where pi∗ denotes arg minpi ∑
T−1
t=0 F
dt+1(pi) and pi0 is the initial market price. For e.g.,
the entropy function defined over the probability simplex (which is the regulariser for
LMSR markets) is 1-strongly convex with respect to the l1 norm [Beck and Teboulle,
2003].
Since each trader makes 1/m trades, we have that pi∗ = arg minpi{∑T−1t=0 Fd
t+1
(pi)} =
arg minpi{Ed∼σ
[
Fd(pi)
]} = arg minpi{∑Kk=1 Fk(pi)} which matches with the equilib-
rium price due to Theorem 1 (K denotes the number of traders). Also we get that
T = 1m .K and ∑
T−1
t=0 (L
dt+1)2 = T.∑N
T
k=1(L
k)2, with Lk being the Lipschitz parameter of
Fk. So we write,
T−1
∑
t=0
Fd
t+1
(pit)− 1
m
K
∑
k=1
Fk(pi∗) ≤
T−1
∑
t=0
〈(pit − pi∗),∇Fdt+1(pit)〉
≤ 1
m
R(pi∗)− 1
m
R(pi0) +
K
σ
.
K
∑
k=1
(Lk)2
or
m
T−1
∑
t=0
Fd
t+1
(pit)−
K
∑
k=1
Fk(pi∗) ≤
T−1
∑
t=0
〈(pit − pi∗), m∇Fdt+1(pit)〉 ≤ Regret(m), (4.2)
§4.3 A regret bound for mini-trading with potential based demands 73
where Regret(m) = R(pi∗)− R(pi0) + m.Kσ .∑Kk=1(Lk)2 denotes the r.h.s. of the inequal-
ity (4.2), which gives us a bound w.r.t the equilibrium situation. We note that this
bound depends on the parameter m.
Now consider a situation where we can write F(pi) = −〈pi, x〉 − F∗(x), where x =
−∇F(pi) + f (pi).1 (is potential based) and 〈pi, x〉 = W. Without loss of generality we
assume that the trader spends his total wealth for the purchase such that 〈pi, x〉 = W.
(If the trader purchases a bundle s such that the resultant position x = W −Π(s) + s,
we get that it is equivalent to purchasing a bundle x such that Π(x) = W) This allows
us to re-write the above regret expression (4.2) as
m
T−1
∑
t=0
Fd
t+1
(pit)−
K
∑
k=1
Fk(pi∗) = −(m
T−1
∑
t=0
(Fd
t+1
)∗(xt)−
K
∑
k=1
(Fk)∗(xk,∗)) ≤ Regret(m)
(4.3)
where xk,∗ is the equilibrium demands of trader k. (using Fdt+1(pit) = −〈pit, xt〉 −
(Fd
t+1
)∗(xt) for the mini-trade demands, Fk(pi∗) = −〈pi∗, xk,∗〉 − (Fk)∗(xk,∗) for the
equilibrium demands and using the fact that 〈pit, xt〉 = 〈pi∗, xk,∗〉 = W)
As examples for when (4.2) can be written as (4.3) consider
1. Risk measure based traders: where F(pi) = α(pi) and F∗(x) = ρ(x), so that
m
T−1
∑
t=0
αd
t+1
(pit)−
K
∑
k=1
αk(pi∗) = −(m
T−1
∑
t=0
ρd
t+1
(xt)−
K
∑
k=1
ρk(xk,∗)).
Thus the objective being minimised in the market is the sum of the penalty
functions (∑T−1t=0 α
dt+1(pit)) or equivalently sum of the risks (∑T−1t=0 α
dt+1(pit)) (see
Theorem 4 for this interpretation regarding the risk function).
2. MEU traders where λ is a constant (i.e., not dependant on pi): where F(pi) =
g∗(−pi) = 1λ f ∗(−λpi), F∗(x) = g(x) = 1λ f (x) = − 1λ 〈p, u(x)〉 = − 1λU(x), so
that
m
T−1
∑
t=0
(g∗)d
t+1
(−pit)−
K
∑
k=1
(g∗)k(pi∗) = m
T−1
∑
t=0
1
λdt
Ud
t+1
(xt)−
K
∑
k=1
1
λk∗
Uk(xk,∗).
Similarly the objective being minimised is the sum of the scaled dual func-
tions (∑T−1t=0 (g
∗)dt+1(−pit)), or sums of the negative of scaled expected utilities
(∑T−1t=0
−1
λd
t Ud
t+1
(xt)).
We thus get that the regret can be also expressed using the dual function of the orig-
inal function that was minimised in mirror descent. Using this dual representation
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we next get an intuition of what mini-trading means for the traders in the market.
4.3.1 Effect of mini-trading for the traders
Considering the above examples, we see that the trader’s objective in the risk mea-
sure based model and MEU model (where λ is a constant) in each trade is to solve
for x that minimises F∗(x), which happens to be x = −∇F(pi) + f (pi).1.
Since each trader makes J = 1/m trades, we denote by pik,j the market price faced by
the trader k in his jth trade and by (Fk,j)∗(x) the kth trader’s objective in his jth trade.
Let xk,j = arg minX(F
k,j)∗(x) such that 〈pi, x〉 = W. We now re-express the regret
bound (4.2) in this notation, resulting in
m
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
Fk(pik,j)−
K
∑
k=1
Fk(pi∗) ≤
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
〈(pik,j − pi∗), m∇Fk(pik,j)〉 ≤ Regret(m) (4.4)
−(
K
∑
k=1
(m.
J
∑
j=1
(Fk,j)∗(xk,j))−
K
∑
k=1
(Fk)∗(xk,∗)) ≤
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
〈(pik,j − pi∗), m∇Fk(pik,j)〉
≤ Regret(m) (4.5)
This implies that no matter what sequence of prices generated by the mini-trading
market, the sum of the average of F∗(x) (i.e., ∑Kk=1(m.∑
J
j=1(F
k,j)∗(xk,j))) faced by the
total traders is not too far from the sum of the F∗(x∗) (i.e., ∑Kk=1(Fk)∗(xk,∗)) in equi-
librium.
In the case of risk measure based traders, this means that the sum of the average
of risks faced by all traders in mini-trading is not too far from the sum of the risks
at equilibrium. This differs from Hu and Storkey [2014]’s interpretation that traders
minimise their risk sequentially in multi-period markets.
In the next chapter, I will use the regret bound (4.4) to compare the wealth up-
date of traders when at equilibrium with the wealth update in sequential mini-trade
markets.
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4.3.2 A brief discussion of convergence rates
Beck and Teboulle [2003] derive convergence and efficiency estimates for mirror de-
scent algorithms using the convexity properties (i.e., lipschitzness and strong con-
vexity) of the objective function and its dual analysis. They show how to obtain the
best efficiency estimate of the (SMD) method, by choosing an appropriate step size.
Thus the SMD interpretation of markets should also allow one to make statements
about the rate of convergence of the mechanism. Beck and Teboulle [2003] show
convergence when the number of update steps goes to infinity, but in mini-trading
the number of update steps are also determined when we decide on the mini-trade
parameter m (i.e., each trader is allowed to trade to a factor of 1/m times). So while
their result may not be directly applicable in mini-trading, we hope that it may be
used to provide convergence properties in our context.
4.4 Summary and conclusions
This chapter examined the potential-based assumption that was used in Chapter 3
with respect to two popular trading models. For first-time MEU traders, it was
shown that not all MEU traders naturally satisfy this assumption, due to the fact that
λ (defined in Lemma 2) may not always be a constant value. But this means that
if λ is a constant as in the case of log utilities (which is not dependant on prices),
this provides a sufficient condition for first-time MEU traders to be considered as
potential-based. Also the exponential negative decay utility example shows that de-
mands may still be expressed as potential-based even if λ is dependant on prices.
So it becomes interesting to find out what properties of utilities determine whether
demands are potential-based.
I also show that first-time risk-measure based traders (in fixed-price pricing) make
potential-based demands due to Theorem 4. So the fact that first-time MEU traders
with exponential negative decay utility make potential-based demands may be also
due to this utility being also considered as a risk-measure (i.e., the negative of its
Certainty Equivalent for MEU demands is the well-studied entropic risk measure).
Using the dual analysis and the potential-based representation, it also becomes pos-
sible to interpret what kind of aggregation the studied markets perform in the limit.
For MEU traders, it can be viewed as (maximising) the sum of (scaled) expected
utilities (even though utility units may not be comparable between traders), and for
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risk measure based traders, it is the sum of the risks (which are in the same unit as
currency). For MEU traders, since the certainly equivalent is the inverse mapping of
the expected utility value to a currency unit, it may be possible to view the objec-
tive function as maximising the sum of (scaled) certainty equivalents. We leave this
as future work. Also Ben-Tal and Teboulle [2007]’s Optimized Certainty Equivalents is
claimed to be the negative of Föllmer and Schied [2002]’s utility based risk-measures.
Thus, it would be interesting to see whether the discussion of this chapter can be ex-
tended to Optimized Certainty Equivalents.
In this thesis, the definition of potential-based demands are only in respect to fixed-
price pricing. Due to the fact that cost-function based pricing is the standard in CSM
markets, and due to the generalised form of representation obtained for first-time
MEU traders in cost-function based pricing (in Section 4.1.3.2), it would be worth-
while to verify whether this type of generalised potential-based representation would
correspond with a generalised form of SMD.
It also becomes interesting to check whether prediction markets can be used to di-
rectly solve for machine learning aggregations. While it is possible to directly use
the corresponding risk-measure based traders (using the dual representation), the
examples from the HARA utility suggests that it may not be possible using a utility
based framework (i.e., either MEU model or utility-based risk-measure model). An
intuition for this may be found in Agrawal et al. [2011]’s discussion (who shows that
the expected utility framework is strictly subsumed by their model that relates to
convex risk measures) which seems to imply that a direct method for minimising
divergence based distances may not be achieved by utility based traders.
Chapter 5
Repeated Markets and Traders’
Wealth Updates
Consider a game of repeated predictions where a series of instances have to be pre-
dicted as explained in Section 2.5. Beygelzimer et al. [2012] and Storkey et al. [2012]
interpret equilibrium wealth updates as Bayesian weight updates in an online learn-
ing setup. This raises the question of whether sequential wealth updates also share
this property.
Furthermore, an equilibrium in a market is usually defined by both the equilib-
rium price and traders’ demands at equilibrium. Chapter 3 relates the price update
mechanism of sequential markets to equilibrium market prices. This understanding
would be made more complete if we could relate equilibrium demands with sequen-
tial demands. Without loss of generality, we could assume that traders spend their
entire wealth when making demands, hence their demands would be equal to the
wealth update vector when the outcome of the market is known.
In this chapter I present preliminary results that connect equilibrium market wealth
updates with sequential market wealth updates. I hope that these results could be
extended so that the Bayesian wealth update interpretation of equilibrium markets
could be also extended to sequential markets.
5.1 Wealth updates in equilibrium and sequential mini-trade
markets
In the case of sequential mini-trading, a trader’s final wealth update is the accumu-
lation of scaled-down demands for the winning outcome. Also the order of trading
is not pre-determined. This makes it difficult to compare each trader’s accumulated
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wealth update to equilibrium wealth updates. For sequential mini-trade markets, we
have two preliminary results that compares the total wealth updates of all the traders
of mini-trade markets with equilibrium markets.
1. Section 5.1.1 presents a bound on the difference between the total expected
wealth updates in a mini-trade market and the total wealth updates in an equi-
librium market.
2. Section 5.1.2 presents a bound on the worstcase difference between the total
wealth updates in a mini-trade market and the total wealth updates in an equi-
librium market.
Ideally, we would like to be able to compare the wealth updates for each traders at an
individual level (as in Figure 3.1 of Section 3.4.3), so that the Bayesian wealth update
interpretation of equilibrium markets could be also extended to sequential markets.
This would have also helped to extend the connection between sequential and equi-
librium markets with respect to trader demands, adding to existing interpretation
with respect to market prices.
5.1.1 Expected total payoff’s in terms of regret analysis
This analysis is based on the regret analysis we obtained in Section 4.3. The regret
terms of the above are re-expressed to obtain the difference of Market makers ex-
pected payoff’s (where expectation is with respect equilibrium price) in sequential
and equilibrium markets. This results in a bound for the expected difference of total
wealth updates which depends on the mini-trade parameter.
Theorem 5. Let pi∗ the equilibrium price, pi0 the initial market price, C be the cost function
of the sequential market with R = C∗ being σ-strongly convex with respect to (w.r.t.) a norm
‖.‖ , K the number of traders and Lk the Lipschitz parameter of Fk w.r.t. the same norm,
assuming trader k makes potential based demands of the form −∇Fk(pi) + f (pi).1. Then
for a mini-trade transformed hybrid sequential market with potential based demands and the
mini-trade parameter m ∈ (0, 1], we have that the difference between the total expected wealth
updates (w.r.t. to the equilibrium price) of the traders in the mini-trade market and the total
wealth updates in a corresponding equilibrium market is bounded by
R(pi∗)− R(pi0) + m.K
σ
.
K
∑
k=1
(Lk)2 := Regret(m)
Proof. Start with the regret Equation (4.4) from Section 4.3 (given below). Assuming
that each trader makes J = 1/m trades, we denote by pik,j the market price faced by
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the trader k in his jth trade.
m
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
Fk(pik,j)−
K
∑
k=1
Fk(pi∗) ≤
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
〈(pik,j − pi∗), m∇Fk(pik,j)〉 ≤ Regret(m)
We now prepare to plug-in the potential-demands (i.e., the jth demand of trader k)
to the above. Without loss of generality1, we assume that the trader makes demands
xk,j = −∇Fk(pik,j) + α.1 such that 〈pik,j, xk,j〉 = W.
Now considering a single step of the regret equation, and by replacing ∇Fk(pik,j),
we get that
〈(pik,j − pi∗), m∇Fk(pik,j)〉 = m.〈(pi∗ − pik,j),−∇Fk(pik,j)〉
= m.〈(pi∗ − pik,j), (xk,j − α.1)〉 = m.〈(pi∗ − pik,j), xk,j〉
= m.{〈pi∗, xk,j〉 − 〈pik,j, xk,j〉+ 〈pi∗, xk,∗〉 − 〈pi∗, xk,∗〉}
= 〈pi∗, m.xk,j〉 − 〈pi∗, m.xk,∗〉 (5.1)
The second equality is due to 〈pi∗, α.1〉 = 〈pik,j, α.1〉 = α, for prices in the N-
simplex. xk,∗ denotes the equilibrium demands of trader k. The last equality is
due to 〈pi∗, xk,∗〉 = 〈pik,j, xk,j〉 = Wk.
The last equality is essentially the difference between the expected wealth update
for the jth mini-trade transformed demand and the expected wealth update for a
mini-trade transformed equilibrium demand for trader k, where the expectation is
with respect to the equilibrium prices. So using (5.1) on (4.4) we get,
1Assume that sk,j = −∇Fk(pik,j) + f (pik,j).1 (i.e., potential-based as in (3.6)), and so the resultant
wealth update can be written as xk,j = Wk −Π(sk,j) + s = −∇Fk(pik,j) + ( f (pik,j) +Wk −Πsk,j).1. This
gives us that −∇Fk(pik,j) = xk,j − ( f (pik,j) +Wk −Πsk,j).1 = xk,j − α.1 for α = f (pik,j) +Wk −Πsk,j.
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K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
〈(pik,j − pi∗), m∇Fk(pik,j)〉 =
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
〈pi∗, m.xk,j〉 − 〈pi∗, m.xk,∗〉
= 〈pi∗,
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,j〉 − 〈pi∗,
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,∗〉
= 〈pi∗,
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,j〉 − 〈pi∗,
K
∑
k=1
xk,∗〉
= 〈pi∗,
K
∑
k=1
(
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,j)〉 −
K
∑
k=1
Wk (5.2)
≤ Regret(m) = R(pi∗)− R(pi0) + m.K
σ
.
K
∑
k=1
(Lk)2
Note that the term ∑Jj=1 m.x
k,j represents the wealth update for trader k in the mini-
trade market, since each demand xk,j is scaled down by m. Let Wk(m) be the total
wealth update for trader k in the mini-trade market (Wk(m) = ∑Jj=1 m.x
k,j). Then the
total wealth updates of all K traders are given by ∑Kk=1 W
k(m) = ∑Kk=1 ∑
J
j=1 m.x
k,j.
Also let the total wealth updates in equilibrium be given by ∑Kk=1 W
k,∗(m). Due to
the equilibrium condition (3.1), we have ∀n,∑Kk=1 xk,∗n = ∑Kk=1 Wk, so ∑Kk=1 Wk,∗(m) =
∑Kk=1 x
k,∗ = (∑Kk=1 Wk).1. So we have that ∀n, 〈pi∗,∑Kk=1 Wk(m)〉 − ∑Kk=1 Wk,∗n (m) =
〈pi∗,∑Kk=1(∑Jj=1 m.xk,j)〉 − ∑Kk=1 Wk ≤ Regret(m) = R(pi∗) − R(pi0) + m.Kσ .∑Kk=1(Lk)2
proving the theorem.
Note that the above wealth update expression (5.2) can also be interpreted as
a bound for the market makers expected loss (i.e., the difference between the total
expected payoff’s and total money collected from the traders). The total expected
payoff’s are the total demands in the mini-trade market : ∑Kk=1 ∑
J
j=1 m.x
k,j. The total
money collected is ∑Kk=1 ∑
J
j=1〈pik,j, m.xk,j〉. Also since 〈pik,j, xk,j〉 = Wk, the trader
actually spends m.Wk for m.xk,j. But since he makes J = 1/m trades, at the end
of trading he would have spent all his wealth Wk. So we get that the total money
collected is the total wealth of the traders (i.e., ∑Kk=1 ∑
J
j=1〈pik,j, m.xk,j〉 = ∑Kk=1 Wk). So
the market makers expected loss is given by ∑Kk=1 ∑
J
j=1 m.x
k,j −∑Kk=1 Wk.
5.1.2 Total wealth updates in terms of the worst-case loss analysis
This section provides a worst-case difference bound in total wealth updates of traders
in sequential and equilibrium markets in terms of the well-known worst-case loss
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bound of the market maker in sequential cost function based markets. The analysis
is similar to the one in Section 3.4.2 and based on the fact that mini-trading scales
down the demands of traders and that in the case of infinitesmal demands the cost
function based pricing equals fixed-price pricing.
Theorem 6. For a mini-trade transformed hybrid sequential market with potential based
demands and the mini-trade parameter m ∈ (0, 1], we have that the worst case difference be-
tween the total wealth updates of the traders in the mini-trade market and the total wealth up-
dates in a corresponding equilibrium market is bounded by suppi∈∆N R(pi)−minpi∈∆N R(pi)
for the limit m→ 0, adopting the notation and settings in Theorem 5.
Proof. Consider the worst case difference between the total wealth updates of the
traders in the mini-trade market and the total wealth updates in a corresponding
equilibrium market, given by maxn∈1,...,N{∑Kk=1 Wkn(m) − ∑Kk=1 Wk,∗n (m)}. Following
the arguments and discusson of Theorem 5, we have that,
lim
m→0
max
n∈1,...,N
{
K
∑
k=1
Wkn(m)−
K
∑
k=1
Wk,∗n (m)} = limm→0 maxn∈1,...,N{
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,jn −
K
∑
k=1
xk,∗n }
= lim
m→0
max
n∈1,...,N
{
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,jn −
K
∑
k=1
Wk}
= lim
m→0
max
n∈1,...,N
{
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
m.xk,jn −
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
〈pik,j, m.xk,j〉}
= lim
m→0
max
n∈1,...,N
{(yT − y0)−
T
∑
t=1
〈∇C(yt−1), (yt − yt−1)〉}
= lim
m→0
max
n∈1,...,N
{(yT − y0)−
T
∑
t=1
(C(yt)− C(yt−1))}
= lim
m→0
max
n∈1,...,N
{(yT − y0)− (C(yT)− C(y0))}
(5.3)
If the market was initialized with some initial position y0, the mini-trade demands
would generate a sequence of positions yt = x0 +∑ti=1 m.x
i and prices pit = ∇C(yt),
giving the fourth equality (with T = K/m, since each trader makes 1/m trades). Also
we have that for cost function based pricing (i.e., limx→0{Πy(x) = C(y+ x)−C(y) =
〈∇C(y), x〉}), for the limit x → 0 by definition. This gives the fifth equality due to
〈∇C(yt−1), (yt − yt−1)〉 = C(yt)− C(yt−1) for m→ 0, since (yt − yt−1) = m.xt.
Now observe that (5.3) gives the worst case difference between the total wealth up-
dates of the traders in the form of worst case loss analysis of market makers. Apply-
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ing the worst case loss bounds for market makers by Abernethy et al. [2011, 2013] for
our market (which trades in Arrow Debreu contracts with prices in the N-simplex),
we get that (5.3) is upper bounded by suppi∈∆N R(pi) −minpi∈∆N R(pi) for the limit
m→ 0, proving the theorem.
If the initial position of the market xo is set, such that pi0 = minpi∈∆N R(pi), we get
that the worst case difference of total wealth updates is given by
max
n∈1,...,N
{
K
∑
k=1
Wkn(m)−
K
∑
k=1
Wk,∗n (m)} ≤ sup
pi∈∆N
R(pi)− R(pi0)
for the limit m → 0. Compare this with the expected difference of total wealth
updates given by Theorem 5, which gives
∀n, 〈pi∗,
K
∑
k=1
Wk(m)〉 −
K
∑
k=1
Wk,∗n (m) ≤ R(pi∗)− R(pi0) +
m.K
σ
.
K
∑
k=1
(Lk)2.
5.2 Open questions related to wealth updates
The preliminary results given in this chapter raises some important questions which
we hope to analyse as future work.
1. Whether the above preliminary results can be extended for individual traders,
so that the interpretation of equilibrium markets as performing Bayesian wealth
updates can be extended for sequential markets? This would also help to relate
equilibrium and sequential markets in terms of both price and wealth updates.
2. Whether the wealth updates of all types of equilibrium markets can be inter-
preted as optimal in a machine learning or Bayesian sense. As summarised in
Section 2.5, the existing interpretation of equilibrium markets as performing
Bayesian updates applies only to log and iso-elastic based MEU trader models.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis aimed to relate sequential cost function based markets with equilibrium
markets in terms of price and demands (wealth updates). I have identified conditions
under which both equilibrium markets and sequential cost function based markets
can be interpreted as solutions to the same learning problem in terms of the market
price, thereby naturally extending the existing interpretations of equilibrium markets
as performing known aggregations to sequential markets. I also give preliminary re-
sults that relate the wealth updates of traders in equilibrium markets to sequential
markets, which would extend the existing interpretations of equilibrium markets as
performing Bayesian updating to sequential markets.
The main result of this thesis (Theorem 1 in Section 3.3) shows that under the as-
sumption of potential-based demands and liquidity insensitive cost functions, the
sequential prices generated by a hybrid pricing mechanism (a pricing mechanism
that is somewhere in between the cost function based and fixed-price mechanisms)
are approximating the solution of a stochastic minimisation problem defined by the
traders’ demands, via Stochastic Mirror Decsent (SMD). Furthermore, the solution
of the problem is necessarily the equilibrium price for the stochastic market generat-
ing the demand operators. This provides a common understanding of instantaneous
and equilibrium prices via an optimisation point of view. This naturally extends the
existing interpretations of equilibrium markets as performing known aggregations
which minimise divergence based distances to the case of sequential markets.
The interpretation as SMD leads to design practical mechanism changes for con-
vergence (i.e., mini-trading markets, which incorporates a learning rate parameter) in
Section 3.4, achieving certain algorithmic properties like price stability (Theorem 2)
and loss bounds. I have also assumed that traders don’t adopt strategic behaviour
[Chen et al., 2009] in mini-trading, since each trade only results in a “small-scale"
impact on the market prices and trades occur in a randomised order. It would be
83
84
interesting to consider how far this assumption is valid and how strategic play (if
occurred) would affect the market prices. Work by Chen et al. [2009] and Ostrovsky
[2012] offer promising directions to consider.
I have also considered how the Maximum expected Utility (MEU) trader model (Sec-
tion 4.1) and the risk-measure based model (Section 4.2) relate to the assumption of
potential-based demands required for Theorem 1. Using this analysis, it is shown
(see Collorary 1 following Theorem 3) that the MEU trader model does not always
satisfy the conditions needed for the SMD interpretation, but provides a sufficient
condition in which this is satisfied. However the risk-measure based trader model
satisfies the conditions needed for the SMD interpretation (Theorem 4) for first-time
traders in a fixed-price setting. For the MEU model it would be interesting to explore
what properties of the utilities would result in this representation. Also it would be
desirable to generalise the potential-based representation to include cost-function
based pricing, hoping that this would result in a (generalised) SMD interpretation
for sequential markets. See Section 4.4 for a more detailed conclusion and future
work with respect to this analysis.
It also becomes interesting to check whether prediction markets can be used to di-
rectly solve for machine learning aggregations. While it is possible to directly use
the corresponding risk-measure based traders (using the dual representation), the
examples from the HARA utility suggests that it may not be possible using a utility
based framework (i.e., either MEU model or utility-based risk-measure model). An
intuition for this may be found in Agrawal et al. [2011]’s discussion (who shows that
the expected utility framework is strictly subsumed by their model that relates to
convex risk measures) which seems to imply that a direct method for minimising
divergence based distances may not be achieved by utility based traders.
Also since exponential negative decay utilities can be considered as the intersection
of MEU and risk based trader models, it becomes interesting to verify whether the
result of Abernethy et al. [2014] (which gives price convergence in “multi-period”
markets for MEU traders with exponential negative decay utilities) can be extended
to general risk measure based traders. This would give a convergence guarantee to
multi-period markets with risk-measure based traders, which is desirable since the
market interpretation by Hu and Storkey [2014] holds when there is convergence.
In Section 4.3, I show that the “regret” of mini-trading markets (with respect to
equilibrium markets) depends on the mini-trade parameter, following the analysis
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of Shalev-Shwartz [2012]. This leads to an intuition of what mini-trading means for
the traders in the market followed by a brief discussion of convergence rates. In
Section 5.1, I use this result to obtain bounds on the total traders’ wealth updates in
mini-trading with respect to equilibrium wealth updates.
Chapter 5 is related to a game of repeated predictions (where a series of instances
have to be predicted) and the interpretation of equilibrium wealth updates as Bayesian
weight updates in an online learning setup [Beygelzimer et al., 2012], [Storkey et al.,
2012] . I give preliminary results (Theorems 5 and 6) that relate the total wealth
updates of traders in equilibrium markets to sequential markets. It would be much
desirable if these results can be extended for individual traders, so that the existing
interpretations of equilibrium markets as performing Bayesian wealth updates can
be extended for sequential markets. Such a result would also help to relate equilib-
rium and sequential markets in terms of both price and wealth updates. It would
also be interesting if the equilibrium market connection to Bayesian updating can be
generalised to other utilities and trader models.
Appendix A
Traders with HARA Utility
The Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA Utility): u(w) = 1β−1
(
(b + βaw)
β−1
β − 1
)
(for a > 0) is defined on the domain b + βaw ≥ 0 with strict inequality for β ≤ 1.
Most representations define HARA using γ = 1β , where γ is the risk-averseness param-
eter, while β is the risk-tolerance parameter. The representation using β is adopted here
in order to relate with Jose et al. [2008]’s results involving the Linear Risk Tolerance
(LRT) utility which can be obtained from HARA by using a=1 and b=1.
HARA is a general class of utilities that are usually used in practice and widely
studied in economics and includes the popular quadratic (β = −1), linear (β → inf),
square-root (β = 2) , log (β→ 1), reciprocal (β = 1/2), iso-elastic (power) (β > 0 and
b=0) and exponential negative decay (β→ 0) utilities.
Note that there is a slight change of notation from Section 2.1.4.1. A trader with
wealth $W makes demands such that the total cost will not exceed an arbitrary bud-
get of $N (i.e., 〈pi, x〉 ≤ N)), for a fixed-price pricing function Πq(x) := 〈q, x〉. We
consider that there are K possible outcomes, and Σk is used as shorthand to ΣKk=1.
A.1 Solution for HARA utilities and the u∗λ-divergence
We consider a prediction market for classification trading in Arrow-Debreu contracts
representing the K possible outcomes. Denote the trader’s risk-averse (concave) util-
ity by u(money), beliefs of the outcome by p ∈ ∆K, market prices by q ∈ ∆K, trader’s
wealth by W and budget for the trade by N (such that 〈x, q〉 ≤ N) where he purchases
the contract bundle (or makes demand) x ∈ RK. If event k occurred the trader’s resul-
tant utility would be u(W − 〈x, q〉+ xk) since each winning contract yields a payoff
of $1.
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Since the trader makes demands to maximize his expected utility, we solve the
following Lagrangian problem. This follows Jose et al. [2008]’s translation of Goll
and Rüschendorf [2001]’s analysis to our particular market setting.
minλ>0 maxx∈RKΣk pku(W − N + xk)− λ(〈x, q〉 − N)
Solving this we obtain,
∂u(W − N + xk)
∂xk
=
∂u(W − N + xk)
∂(W − N + xk) = λ
qk
pk
If I(y) = (∂u)−1(y), we can solve for the demand x by,
W − N + xk = I
(
λ
qk
pk
)
Using the budget constraint (〈x, q〉 = N), λ is implicitly uniquely determined by,
Σkqk I
(
λ
qk
pk
)
= W
Using the convex conjugate of u, u∗(y) ≡ supx∈Ru(x)− xy = u(I(y))− yI(y) Jose
et al. [2008], the constrained maximum expected utility (MEU) is derived (denoted
by UW(p||q)) for our trader with budget N following Goll and Rüschendorf [2001]
and Jose et al. [2008].
UW(p||q) = minλ>0 maxx∈RKΣk pku(W − N + xk)− λ(〈x, q〉 − N)
= minλ>0 maxx∈RKΣk pk
[
u(W − N + xk)− (W − N + xk)λ qkpk
]
+ Σk pk(W − N)λ qkpk + λN
= minλ>0 maxx∈RKΣk pk
[
u
(
I
(
λ
qk
pk
))
−
(
λ
qk
pk
)
.I
(
λ
qk
pk
)]
+ λ(W − N) + λN
= minλ>0Σk pku∗
(
λ
qk
pk
)
+ λW
= minλ>0u∗λ(p||q) + λW, [let u∗λ(p||q) to be = Σk pku∗
(
λ
qk
pk
)
] Jose et al. [2008]
u∗λ(p||q) is defined by setting f (x) = u∗(λx) on the f-divergence [Csiszàr, 1967]
between q and p [Goll and Rüschendorf, 2001] [Jose et al., 2008]. They further show
a duality relationship in the case of incomplete markets where there is a set of risk-
neutral distributions (prices) denoted by Q (as with a bid-ask spread), such that the
q ∈ Q which are the least favourable (adversarial) prices for a utility maximizing
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agent is the same q ∈ Q which has the minimum u∗λ-divergence.
Solving the budget constrained utility maximization problem for the non-linear HARA
utilities, we get; I(y) = 1aβ
[(
a
y
)β − b]
(
λ
a
)β
= Σkqk(pk/qk)
β
b+βaW
W − N + xk = I(λ qkpk ) = 1aβ
[(
apk
λqk
)β − b] = (W+ baβ)qk qk(pk/qk)βΣkqk(pk/qk)β − baβ
u∗(y) = u(I(y))− yI(y) = (y/a)1−β
β(β−1) +
yb
βa − 1β−1
UW(p||q) = Σk pku(W − N + xk) = 1β−1
[
(b + βaw)
β−1
β
(
Σkqk(pk/qk)β
)1/β − 1]
u∗λ(p||q) = UW(p||q) - λW Or,
u∗λ(p||q) = Σk pku∗(λ qkpk ) = Σk pk
[ (
λqk
apk
)1−β
β(β−1) +
λqkb
βapk
− 1β−1
]
= Σk pk
[ (
apk
λqk
)β−1
β(β−1)
]
+ λbβa − 1β−1
A.2 HARA and the power and pseudo-spherical scores and
divergences
Jose et al. [2008] connects the LRT utilities with weighted scoring rules that reward
an agent in proportion to some measure of the distance p (belief or forecast) from
an appropriate baseline distribution q. They obtain the weighted power score and
weighted pseudo-spherical score by substituting the ratio pk/qk for pk in the power
and pseudo-spherical [Good, 1971] scoring rules. Let SPβ (p, q, k) be the reward of the
weighted power score and SSβ(p, q, k) be the reward of the weighted pseudo-spherical
score in the event of outcome k.
SPβ (p, q, k) =
(pk/qk)β−1−1
β−1 − Σkqk(pk/qk)
β−1
β (the weighted power score)
SSβ(p, q, k) =
1
β−1
((
pk/qk
(Σkqk(pk/qk)β)1/β
)β−1 − 1) (the weighted pseudo-spherical score)
A.2.1 The power divergences
They show that the optimal expected score of the weighted power score (denoted
by SPβ (p, q)) is a power divergence (denoted by D
P
β (p, q)) [Havrda and Charvát,
1967], which is obtained by using f (x) = (x
β−1−1)
β(β−1) on an f-divergence of the form
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∫
f
(
p(s)
q(s)
)
p(s)ds [Jose et al., 2008].
SPβ (p, q) = D
P
β (p, q) =
Σkqk(pk/qk)β−1
β(β−1) (the power divergence)
Let f β(x) = x(x
β−1−1)
β(β−1) , then we can alternatively define the power divergence us-
ing f β(x) on an f-divergence of the form
∫
f
(
p(s)
q(s)
)
q(s)ds
A.2.2 The power divergences and α-divergence:
We show that the power divergences are equivalent to α-divergences [Chernoff, 1952]
denoted by Dα(p, q) (which is obtained by using f α(u) on an f-divergence of the
form
∫
f
(
q(s)
p(s)
)
p(s)ds), since f β(x) is a dual of f α(u) (i.e. f β(x) = x. f α(1/x)) when
α = 1− 2β.
f α(u) =

− log u α = −1
u log u α = 1
4
1−α2
{
1− u 1+α2
}
α 6= ±1
Dα(p, q) =

∫
p(s) log p(s)q(s) ds = KL(p, q) α = −1∫
q(s) log q(s)p(s) ds = KL(q, p) α = 1
4
1−α2
{
1− ∫ ( p(s)q(s)) 1−α2 q(s)ds} α 6= ±1
A.2.3 The pseudo-spherical divergences
Jose et al. [2008] also define another type of divergences called pseudo-spherical di-
vergences (denoted by DSβ(p, q)) which is the optimal expected score of the weighted
pseudo-spherical score (denoted by SSβ(p, q)). While this is not an f-divergence, it is
monotonically related to the power divergences (which is an f-divergence)
SSβ(p, q) = D
S
β(p, q) =
(Σkqk(pk/qk)β)1/β−1
β−1 (the pseudo-spherical divergence)
A.2.4 Connections with scoring rules and divergences
The following two observations for the generic HARA utilities closely matches Jose
et al. [2008]’s results for LRT utilities;
1) The utility of a HARA agent in the event that outcome k occurred (u(W−N + xk))
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happens to be affinely related to weighted Pseudo-spherical Score.
u(W − N + xk) = u
(
I(λ qkpk )
)
= 1β−1
[(
pka
qkλ
)β−1 − 1]
= 1β−1
[
(b + βaW)
β−1
β
(
pk/qk
(Σkqk(pk/qk)β)1/β
)β−1 − 1], (by using (λa )β = Σkqk(pk/qk)βb+βaW )
= 1β−1
[
(b + βaW)
β−1
β [(β− 1)SSβ(p, q, k) + 1]− 1
]
= (b + βaW)
β−1
β SSβ(p, q, k) + u(W)
2)The constrained maximum expected utility (MEU) is affinely related to the pseudo-
spherical divergence, which in turn is monotonically related to the power divergence
(or alpha-divergence)
UW(p||q) = Σk pku(W − N + xk) = 1β−1
[
(b + βaw)
β−1
β
(
Σkqk(pk/qk)β
)1/β − 1]
= 1β−1
[
(b + βaW)
β−1
β [(β− 1)DSβ(p, q) + 1]− 1
]
= (b + βaW)
β−1
β DSβ(p, q) + u(W)
Further we can show that the u∗λ-divergence is also affinely related to the pseudo-
spherical divergence.
u∗λ(p||q) = Σk pku∗(λ qkpk ) (Or = UW(p||q)− λW)
= Σk pk
[(
λqk
apk
)1−β
β(β−1) +
λqkb
βapk
− 1β−1
]
, (using u∗(y) = (y/a)
1−β
β(β−1) +
yb
βa − 1β−1 )
= Σk pk
[(
apk
λqk
)β−1
β(β−1)
]
+ λbβa − 1β−1
...
...
= (b+aW)
(b+βaW)1/β
1
(β−1)
(
Σkqk(pk/qk)β
)1/β − 1β−1 , (by using (λa )β = Σkqk(pk/qk)βb+βaW )
= (b+aW)
(b+βaW)1/β
1
(β−1) [(β− 1)DSβ(p, q) + 1]− 1β−1
= (b+aW)
(b+βaW)1/β D
S
β(p, q) +
1
β−1
[
(b+aW)
(b+βaW)1/β − 1
]
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